连锁股东与企业人力资本结构调整—

摘要连锁股东作为资本市场上企业间的经济关联,能否在企业人力资本结构调整的过程中发挥其作为生产要素的积极作用值得关注。基于超额雇员的视角,以2008—2020年中国沪深A股上市企业为样本,考察了连锁股东与企业人力资本结构调整的关系。研究结果表明:连锁股东对企业超额雇员具有显著的抑制作用。以上结果在处理内生性问题和进行了一系列稳健性检验后保持稳健。机制分析表明,连锁股东通过提升企业治理水平进而抑制了超额雇员,从而起到人力资本结构调整的作用。异质性检验表明,连锁股东对超额雇员的抑制作用在财务风险较低及国有企业的情境下更为显著。研究结果为连锁股东的协同发展效应和监督治理作用提供了新的证据,拓展和丰富了连锁股东经济后果的相关研究,为企业人力资本结构调整的外部治理提供了支持性证据与实践建议。

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关键词：连锁股东人力资本结构超额雇员企业治理水平财务风险产权性质

Abstract： As the economic connection among enterprises in the capital market, whether cross-ownership shareholders can play a positive role as a factor of production in the process of enterprise human capital structure adjustment deserves attention. From the perspective of excess employees, this paper examines the relationship between cross-ownership shareholders and the adjustment of human capital structure bansed on samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020. The result shows that cross-ownership shareholders have a significant inhibitory effect on excess employees. And the above results remain robust after dealing with endogenous problems and a series of robustness tests. The mechanism analysis shows that cross-ownership shareholders restrain the excess employees by improving the level of corporate governance, thus playing a role in the adjustment of human capital structure. In addition, heterogeneity test states that the inhibitory effect of chain shareholders on excess employees is more significant in the context of low financial risk and state-owned enterprises. The results provide new evidence for the coordinated development effect and supervision and governance of chain shareholders, expand and enrich the related research on the economic consequences of chain shareholders, and provide supporting evidence and practical suggestions for the external governance of enterprise human capital structure adjustment.

Keywords： Cross-ownership Shareholders Human Capital Structure Excess Employees Corporate Governance Financial Risk Property Right Nature

收稿日期 2021-12-27; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL139)

作者简介: 王新光(1996— ),男,山东聊城人,博士研究生,主要从事企业经济、公司金融研究;盛宇华(1958— ),男,江苏连云港人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事管理决策与领导科学、人力资源和企业产权制度研究。王新光为本文通信作者。

引用本文:

王新光, 盛宇华.连锁股东与企业人力资本结构调整——基于超额雇员的视角[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,5: 110-120

WANG Xinguang, SHENG Yuhua.Cross-ownership Shareholders and the Adjustment of Enterprise Human Capital Structure:From the Perspective of Excess Employees[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(5): 110-120

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I5/110

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