薪酬管制与企业盈余持续性

摘要基于薪酬改革的制度背景,以2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了薪酬管制对企业盈余持续性及其组成部分的影响。实证结果发现:薪酬管制对企业盈余持续性及其组成部分的持续性皆具有显著的负面影响。同时,企业产权性质不同时,二者之间的负向关系也存在差异,薪酬管制对国有企业盈余持续性的影响相较非国有企业更为显著;且对中央国企盈余持续性的影响也相较地方国企更为显著。进一步的研究表明,管理层权力会显著增强薪酬管制与盈余及其组成部分持续性之间的负向关系。研究结论不仅拓展了薪酬管制对企业长期发展的影响研究,而且为推进我国企业薪酬制度改革,完善薪酬管制政策提供了经验证据。

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	申毅
	阮青松

关键词：薪酬管制盈余持续性产权性质管理层权力

Abstract： Taking the compensation reform system as the research background and Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as the research samples, this paper examines the impact of compensation regulation on corporate earnings persistence and its components. The results show that compensation regulation has a significant negative impact on the persistence of corporate earnings and its components. At the same time, when the nature of enterprise property rights is different, the negative relationship between them is also different. The impact of compensation regulation on earnings persistence of state-owned enterprises is more significant than that of non-state-owned enterprises, and the impact on earnings persistence of central state-owned enterprises is also more significant than that of local state-owned enterprises. Further study indicates that managerial power enhances the negative relationship between compensation regulation and earnings persistence. The conclusions not only expand the research on the impact of compensation regulation on the long-term development of enterprises, but also provide empirical evidence for promoting compensation system reform and improving the implementation of compensation regulation.

Keywords： Compensation Regulation Earnings Persistence Property Characteristics Managerial Power

收稿日期 2020-05-05; 接受日期 ;

作者简介: 申毅(1989— ),女,江苏盐城人,博士,主要从事公司金融研究;阮青松(1971— ),男,湖南怀化人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司金融研究。

引用本文:

申毅, 阮青松.薪酬管制与企业盈余持续性[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,1: 118-126

SHEN Yi, RUAN Qingsong.Compensation Regulation and Earnings Persistence[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(1): 118-126

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I1/118

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