薪酬管制对企业盈余管理影响的研究——基于应计及真实盈余管理的检验

摘要以限薪令为制度背景,运用2009—2015年沪深两市上市公司数据,深入分析了薪酬管制是否会诱发高管实施应计盈余管理或真实盈余管理的行为。研究发现,薪酬管制与企业应计盈余管理显著负相关,与真实盈余管理显著正相关,因此严格的薪酬管制会诱发高管进行真实盈余管理;同时相较于非国有企业,薪酬管制对国有企业的影响更为显著;相较于地方企业,薪酬管制对中央企业的影响更为显著。

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	申毅
	阮青松

关键词：薪酬管制应计盈余管理真实盈余管理产权性质

Abstract： Under the regulation context of the salary ceiling order, this paper carries out a profound analysis on whether compensation regulation leads to accrued or real earnings management among top management, using data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2015. It is found that compensation regulation is negatively related to accrued earnings management, but positively related to real earnings management, which means a strict compensation regulation will lead to real earnings management among top executives. Meanwhile, compared with non-SOEs,compensation regulation has a greater impact on SOEs, among whom, compensation regulation has a greater impact on central SOEs than local SOEs.

Keywords： Compensation Regulation Accrued Earnings Management Real Earnings Management Nature of Property Rights

收稿日期 2017-02-11; 接受日期 2017-11-22;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学研究项目(15YJAZH060)

作者简介: 申毅(1989— ),女,江苏盐城人,博士研究生,主要从事公司金融研究;阮青松(1971— ),男,湖南怀化人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司金融研究。

引用本文:

申毅, 阮青松.薪酬管制对企业盈余管理影响的研究——基于应计及真实盈余管理的检验[J]. 经济经纬, 2017,6: 105-110

SHEN Yi, RUAN Qing-song.Research on the Effect of Compensation Regulation on Corporate Earnings Management——A Test Based on Accrued and Real Earnings Management[J] Economic Survey, 2017,V34(6): 105-110

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V34/I6/105