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    监督抑或掏空:纵向兼任高管与企业债务融资
韩金红, 支皓
新疆财经大学 会计学院,新疆 乌鲁木齐 830012
    Supervision or Tunneling: Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Enterprise Debt Financing
    HAN Jinhong, ZHI Hao
School of Accounting, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi 830012, China
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摘要 基于中国A股上市公司2008—2019年的数据,从“监督效应”和“掏空效应”双重视角考察了纵向兼任高管对企业债务融资的影响。研究发现:上市公司存在纵向兼任高管时,债务融资成本较高,债务融资期限较短,并且这种效应在非国有企业更加显著。通过探索其影响机制,发现纵向兼任高管通过资金占用发挥了“掏空效应”。进一步分析发现,兼任强度越强,大股东控制力越弱,纵向兼任高管的“掏空效应”越显著,而且相比总经理纵向兼任,董事长纵向兼任对企业债务融资的影响更加显著。研究结论丰富了纵向兼任高管的公司治理效应研究。
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韩金红
支皓
关键词： 纵向兼任高管    企业债务融资   产权性质   “掏空效应”     
Abstract： Based on the date of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2019, this paper examines the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on enterprise debt financing from the perspectives of “supervisory effect” and “tunneling effect”. The study finds that when there are vertical interlocks of executives in listed companies, the cost of enterprise’s debt financing is higher, the debt financing period is shorter, and this effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises. The paper also finds that the vertical interlocks of executives play a “tunneling effect” through capital occupation. Through further research, this paper indicates that the stronger the concurrently position is, the weaker the controlling power of major shareholders is, and the more significant the “tunneling effect” of vertical interlocks of executives is. Moreover, compared with the vertical concurrent tenure of the general manager, the vertical interlocks of the chairman have a more significant the impact on enterprises debt financing. This paper can enrich the research on the corporate governance effects of the vertical interlocks of executives and is a useful supplement to its economic consequences.
Keywords： Vertical Interlocks of Executives   Enterprise Debt Financing   Property Nature   Tunneling Effect     
收稿日期 2020-05-15; 接受日期 ;
基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目(71662030);新疆维吾尔自治区社会科学基金项目(20AZD005);新疆维吾尔自治区天山青年计划优秀青年科技人才项目(2019Q024);新疆维吾尔自治区研究生科研创新项目(XJGRI2017120)
作者简介: 韩金红(1979— ),女,河北深州人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事上市公司财务与会计研究;支皓(1994— ),女,山西运城人,硕士研究生,主要从事上市公司财务与会计研究。
引用本文:   
韩金红, 支皓.监督抑或掏空:纵向兼任高管与企业债务融资[J].  经济经纬, 2021,1: 114-123
HAN Jinhong, ZHI Hao.Supervision or Tunneling: Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Enterprise Debt Financing[J]  Economic Survey, 2021,V38(1): 114-123
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http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/     或     http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I1/114
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