One of the effects of debt constraints governance is the impact on the compensation incentive of executives in listed companies. As a form of management power rent-seeking, excess perks will affect the governance function of debt constraints. Through an empirical analysis on the sample data of China’s listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock markets from 2010 to 2015, this paper finds that with the increase of debt constraints, shareholders will reduce the debt agency cost by reducing performance sensitivity of senior executives, thus showing more concern for creditors’ interests. By quantifying excess perks, this paper then finds that they can weaken the negative effects of debt constraints on performance sensitivity of senior executives and this weakening effect is more significant in non-state-owned firms. It is found that excess perks weaken the governance effects of debt constraints on executive salaries due to the fact that senior executives are empowered to customize their pay. The purpose of this paper is to provide new considerations to creditors in pricing credit risk.