高管薪酬黏性、代理成本与研发操纵治理

摘要以2008—2020年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了高管薪酬黏性对研发操纵的治理效应及作用机制。研究结果发现:高管薪酬黏性能够显著抑制研发操纵;作用机制检验表明,代理成本的降低是高管薪酬黏性影响研发操纵的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,相较于“奖优-罚劣”型薪酬契约,具有黏性特征的“奖优-奖劣”型薪酬契约对研发操纵具有显著的抑制作用,尤其是业绩下降时高管薪酬略微增加的“奖优-低奖劣”型薪酬契约的治理作用更明显。此外,高管薪酬黏性还有助于缓解研发操纵对专利申请量和授权量的负面影响,提高公司未来创新产出。因此,企业应加强对研发费用异常情形的关注和监督,并构建“重赏轻罚”的高管薪酬黏性激励机制,充分发挥其在创新投资决策中的激励和约束效用;政府相关部门应营造“重赏轻罚”的营商环境,缓解创新决策者和参与者的后顾之忧。

	Service

	把本文推荐给朋友
	加入我的书架
	加入引用管理器
	Email Alert
	RSS
	作者相关文章
	史方
	宁金辉
	苑泽明

关键词：高管薪酬黏性研发操纵代理成本创新产出治理

Abstract： Taking the A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2020 as the research sample, this paper examines the governance effect and mechanism of executive pay stickiness on R & D manipulation. The results show that executive compensation stickiness can significantly inhibit R&D manipulation. The mechanism test indicates that the reduction of agency cost is an important channel through which executive compensation stickiness affects R&D manipulation. Further study shows that, compared with the “reward excellent-punish inferior” salary contract, the “reward excellent-reward inferior” salary contract with viscous characteristics has a significant inhibitory effect on R&D manipulation, especially the governance effect of the “reward excellent-low reward inferior” salary contract with a slight increase in executive compensation when performance decreases. In addition, it is also helpful to alleviate the negative impact of R&D manipulation on patent applications and grants, and improve the company’s future innovation output. Therefore, enterprises should pay more attention to and supervise the abnormal situation of R&D expenses, build a sticky incentive mechanism of executive compensation with “heavy reward and light punishment”, and give full play to its incentive and restraint effect in innovation investment decision-making. Relevant government departments should create a social culture and innovation environment of “heavy reward and light punishment” to alleviate the worries of innovation decision makers and participants.

Keywords： Stickiness of Executive Compensation R&D Manipulation Agency Cost Innovation Output Governance

收稿日期 2022-04-19; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:河北省教育厅高等学校人文社会科学研究青年拔尖人才项目(BJS2022003);河北省社会科学基金项目(HB21GL042);河北省省属高等学校基本科研业务费研究项目(KY2021076)

通讯作者 宁金辉(1990— ),男,河北邯郸人,博士,副教授,主要从事环境会计与财务管理研究。

作者简介: 史方(1990— ),女,河南南阳人,博士研究生,主要从事财务管理、公司治理与企业创新研究;苑泽明(1964— ),女,天津人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事财务管理、无形资产会计与评估研究。

引用本文:

史方, 宁金辉, 苑泽明.高管薪酬黏性、代理成本与研发操纵治理[J]. 经济经纬, 2023,1: 120-129

SHI Fang, NING Jinhui, YUAN Zeming.Executive Compensation Stickiness, Agency Cost and R&D Manipulation Governance[J] Economic Survey, 2023,V40(1): 120-129

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2023/V40/I1/120

步丹璐,文彩虹,2013.高管薪酬黏性增加了企业投资吗?[J].财经研究(6):63-72.
陈冬华,范从来,沈永建,等,2010.职工激励、工资刚性与企业绩效:基于国有非上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究(7):116-129.
楚有为,2018.审计委员会专业背景与企业研发活动盈余操纵[J].现代财经(10):96-113.
范海峰,胡玉明,2013.R&D支出、机构投资者与公司盈余管理[J].科研管理(7):24-30.
胡海峰,白宗航,王爱萍,2022.管理层过度自信对公司违规行为的影响研究[J].经济经纬(5):89-98.
刘运国,刘雯,2007.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界(1):128-136.
罗宏,黄文华,2008.国企分红、在职消费与公司业绩[J].管理世界(9):139-148.
万源星,许永斌,2019.高新认定办法、研发操纵与企业技术创新效率[J].科研管理(4):54-62.
万源星,许永斌,许文瀚,2020.加计扣除政策、研发操纵与民营企业自主创新[J].科研管理(2):83-93.
王兰芳,王悦,侯青川,2019.法治环境、研发“粉饰”行为与绩效[J].南开管理评论(2):128-141,185.
王贞洁,王惠,李真真,2021.竞争战略、资本经营与企业绩效[J].经济经纬(6):103-112.
温忠麟,张雷,侯杰泰,等,2004.中介效应检验程序及其应用[J].心理学报(5):614-620.
徐经长,曾雪云,2010.公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约[J].会计研究(3):12-19,96.
徐悦,刘运国,蔡贵龙,2018.高管薪酬黏性与企业创新[J].会计研究(7):43-49.
杨国超,刘静,廉鹏,等,2017.减税激励、研发操纵与研发绩效[J].经济研究(8):110-124.
苑泽明,史方,金宇,2020.政府创新补助的激励扭曲效应:基于我国上市公司研发操纵行为的检验[J].软科学(2):39-43,58.
张继德,姜鹏,2016.股权结构、产权性质与高管薪酬黏性:基于我国A股上市公司的实证研究[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)(6):83-91.
赵玲,黄昊,2022.容错机制建设、担当激励与企业创新[J].经济经纬(2):110-119.
周泽将,雷玲,2020.纪委参与改善了国有企业监事会的治理效率吗?——基于代理成本视角的考察[J].财经研究(3):34-48.
朱红军,王迪,李挺,2016.真实盈余管理动机下的研发投资决策后果:基于创新和税收的分析视角[J].南开管理评论(4):36-48,86.
GOPALAN R, MILBOURN T, SONG F,2010.Strategie flexibility and the optimality of pay for sector performance[J]. Review of financial studies,23(5):2060-2098.
GUNNY K A,2010.The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance:evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks[J].Contemporary accounting research, 27(3):855-888.
HOLDEN C W, LUNDSTRUM L L,2009.Costly trade,managerial myopia,and long-term investment[J].Journal of empirical finance,16(1):126-135.
JENSEN M C, MECKLING W H,1976.Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of financial and economics,3(4):305-360.
MYERS S,1984.The capital structure puzzle[J].Journal of finance,39(3):575-592.
SHAW K W, ZHANG M H,2010.Is CEO cash compensation punished for poor firm performance?[J].The accounting review,85(3):1065-1093.
SKAIFE H,SWENSON L,WANGERIN D,2017.Discretionary classification shifting of R&D expense[J].Social science electronic pulishing,1(6):11-37.
SHLEIFER A, VISHNY R W,1997. A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of finance,52(2):737-783.
WISEMAN R M, GOMEZ-MEJIA L,1998.A behavioral agency model of managerial risk taking[J].Academy of management review,23(1):133-153.