生态环境监管的企业环保投资效应研究——基于中央环保督察的准自然实验

摘要利用2008—2018年重污染行业上市公司面板数据,以中央环保督察组首轮进驻为准自然实验,使用多期DID模型实证检验了中央环保督察对企业环保投资的影响。研究表明:中央环保督察组进驻后,企业环保投资规模显著扩大。中央环保督察能够通过地方政府治理压力的中介作用进一步影响企业环保投资,以“督政”来“督企”的环境治理策略效果明显;制度环境优化能够保障环保政策的有效实施,政商关系的“亲”“清”程度越高越有利于提高中央环保督察的实施;为吸引外部优质资源的政府竞争能够增强中央环保督察对企业的影响,而为追求经济增长的政府竞争会削弱这一政策的作用效果;相比非国有企业,中央环保督察对国有企业的环保投资增大具有更显著的作用。文章的研究结论为政府进一步完善生态监管制度提供有益启示。

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	杨兰品
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关键词：生态环保督察企业环保投资政府治理压力政商关系政府竞争

Abstract： Base on the panel data of A-share listed heavily polluted companies from 2008 to 2018 and taking the first round of the central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) as quasi natural experiment, this paper empirically tests the impact of the Central Environmental Protection Supervision Group on the environmental protection investment of enterprises by using a multi period DID model on the basis of theoretical analysis. The study shows that after the arrival of the central environmental protection supervision team, the scale of environmental protection investment of enterprises has increased significantly, and this conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests. It is also found that CEPI can further influence corporate environmental investment through the intermediary role of local government governance pressures, and that the effect of environmental governance strategy of “supervising the government” to “supervising enterprises” is effective. And the optimization of institutional environment can ensure the effective implementation of environmental protection policy, and the higher the “pro” and “clear” degree of the relationship between government and business, the better the implementation of the central environmental protection inspector. Additionally, the government competition to attract external high-quality resources can enhance the influence of the central environmental protection inspectors on enterprises, while the government competition in pursuit of economic growth will weaken the effect of this policy. Further study indicates that, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the CEPI had a more significant effect on increased corporate environmental investment by state-owned enterprises. The above conclusions enrich the literature of environmental protection inspectors and their influence, and provides useful inspirations for the government to further improve the ecological supervision system.

Keywords： Central Environmental Protection Inspector Enterprise Environmental Investment Government Governance Pressures Political-business Relations Government Competition

收稿日期 2021-06-09; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(18BJL048)

作者简介: 杨兰品(1964— ),女,河南汝州人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事产业经济、公共经济研究;陈姣余(1997— ),女,福建漳州人,硕士研究生,主要从事公共经济研究。

引用本文:

杨兰品, 陈姣余.生态环境监管的企业环保投资效应研究——基于中央环保督察的准自然实验[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,6: 150-160

YANG Lanpin, CHEN Jiaoyu.The Corporate Environmental Investment Effect of Ecological Regulation: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Central Environmental Protection Inspection[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(6): 150-160

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I6/150

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