治理环境、股权激励行权限制与公司业绩预告策略

摘要中国上市公司股权激励制度要求必须设定锁定期和分期解锁计划,构成了行权限制特征。选择2010—2018年沪、深两市A股公司的年度数据为样本,深入研究公司内外治理环境约束下股权激励行权限制对业绩预告策略的影响,研究发现:长期权益能够提高业绩预告形式上的精确性和实质上的准确性,其决策有用性增强,而短期权益的影响并不显著,反而有可能使业绩预告信息质量降低。进一步分析表明,股权激励行权限制的效应依赖于公司内外治理环境,长期权益在低股权集中度和低机构投资者持股、高市场化水平和高法治水平下能够提高公司业绩预告信息质量,而短期权益效应基本上不具有统计上的显著性;低法治水平下,长期权益和短期权益都能够促进业绩预告准确性提高,其中,短期权益的激励作用更强。结论丰富了公司内外治理环境约束下股权激励经济后果和业绩预告影响因素相关研究,为高管激励对公司信息披露行为的影响提供了新的经验证据。

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	王浩

关键词：治理环境股权激励行权限制业绩预告

Abstract： Chinese equity incentive regulations require the listed companies set vesting restrictions and installment unlock arrangement, which are the characteristics of vesting restrictions. This paper studies the effect of vesting restrictions on corporate earnings forecast strategy under the internal and external governance environment based on the annual data of A share listed firms from 2010—2018. The research evidence shows that Long-term equity can significantly improve the formal precision and essential truth, and the information decision usefulness is enhanced, however the impact of Short-term equity is not significant, and it may reduce the information quality. Further tests show that, the effect of vesting restrictions depends on the internal and external governance environment; Long-term equity can improve the information quality under the conditions of low ownership concentration, low institutional investors’ shareholding, high market level and high law level, and Short-term equity effect is not statistically significant; Under the low law level, both Long-term and Short-term equity can improve the essential truth, and Short-term equity has greater incentive effect. These results may enrich the relevant research, and provide some new empirical evidence on the influence of executive incentive on corporate information disclosure behavior.

Keywords： Governance Environment Equity Incentive Vesting Restrictions Earnings Forecast

收稿日期 2019-08-31; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2019BJJ004;2020BJJ008);河南省软科学研究项目(202400410379);河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(2019-ZZJH-022)

作者简介: 王浩(1973— ),男,河南南阳人,管理学博士,主要从事资本市场与公司治理研究。

引用本文:

王浩.治理环境、股权激励行权限制与公司业绩预告策略[J]. 经济经纬, 2020,6: 118-127

WANG Hao.Governance Environment, Equity Incentive Vesting Restrictions and Corporate Earnings Forecast Strategy[J] Economic Survey, 2020,V37(6): 118-127

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2020/V37/I6/118

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