基于并购的开放式创新与高管薪酬契约研究

摘要以2009—2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了基于并购的开放式创新对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现:通过并购方式实现的开放式创新能够显著提升高管薪酬水平与薪酬业绩敏感性。创新风险的降低与创新产出的提升,在基于并购的开放式创新对高管薪酬契约的影响中起到了中介作用;基于并购的开放式创新提升高管薪酬水平的效应在国有企业中更明显,而提升薪酬业绩敏感性的效应在民营企业中更明显;在市场化水平高的区域,基于并购的开放式创新对高管薪酬水平与薪酬业绩敏感性的影响更大。研究结论丰富了创新视角下高管薪酬契约决定机理的研究,对制定差异化创新激励机制具有一定的指导意义。

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	郑雅君
	崔永梅

关键词：基于并购的开放式创新高管薪酬薪酬业绩敏感性

Abstract： Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as research objects, this paper empirically tests the impact of the open innovation based on mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation contracts. It is found that the open innovation through M&As can significantly improve the amount of executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity. The reduction of innovation risk and the improvement of innovation output play an intermediary role in the influence of open innovation based on M&A on executive compensation contract. Further study shows that the effect of open innovation based on M&A to improve executive compensation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises, while the effect of improving compensation performance sensitivity is more obvious in private enterprises. In addition, in areas with a high level of marketization, open innovation based on mergers and acquisitions has a more significant impact on executive compensation level and pay performance sensitivity. The conclusion of this paper not only enriches the research on the decision mechanism of executive compensation contract from the perspective of innovation, but also has a certain guiding significance for the formulation of differentiated innovation incentive mechanism.

Keywords： Open Innovation Executive Compensation Pay Performance Sensitivity

收稿日期 2020-09-14; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:江西省社会科学规划项目(19GL17);江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(GL18203)

作者简介: 郑雅君(1982— ),女,浙江永康人,北京交通大学博士研究生,华东交通大学讲师,主要从事企业并购与公司财务研究;崔永梅(1969— ),女,山东烟台人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事并购重组研究。

引用本文:

郑雅君, 崔永梅.基于并购的开放式创新与高管薪酬契约研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2021,5: 91-100

ZHENG Yajun, CUI Yongmei.A Study on the Impact of the Open Innovation Based on M&A and Executive Compensation Contracts[J] Economic Survey, 2021,V38(5): 91-100

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I5/91

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