技术类员工股权激励与企业创新效率——兼论激励计划授予股票数限额的规定

摘要利用从股权激励相关公告中手工收集的各企业技术类员工股权激励数据,通过逐年倾向得分匹配后,采用双重差分模型,考察了技术类员工股权激励对创新效率的总体和动态影响及机制,并分析了企业和股权激励计划特征对该影响的调节作用。研究发现:(1)技术类员工股权激励通过降低技术类员工的代理成本、提高技术类员工的知识分享及合作与监督、吸引和挽留更多的技术类员工,进而提高创新效率,其对创新效率的提高作用逐年增强。(2)当企业为非国有企业、高新技术企业、董事长不具有研发职业背景以及具有研发职业背景董事占董事会比重更低时,技术类员工股权激励更能提高创新效率。(3)股权激励对每个激励对象的激励作用存在边际效应递减规律,对属于同一部门的技术类员工激励时也存在因激励对象数量过大导致的“搭便车”现象。研究进一步深化了员工股权激励的相关研究,可为完善股权激励管理办法、企业设计员工股权激励计划及人力资源管理提供经验证据。

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	刘张发
	章卫东

关键词：技术类员工股权激励创新效率

Abstract： Using manually collected equity incentive data from equity incentive announcements for technical employees in various enterprises, and after matching the propensity scores year by year, this paper adopts a double difference model to examine the overall and dynamic impact and mechanism of equity incentives for technical employees on innovation efficiency, and analyzes the moderating effect of enterprise and equity incentive plan characteristics on this impact. The conclusions of are as follows: (i) Equity incentive for technology employees can improve innovation efficiency by reducing agency costs of technology employees, improving knowledge sharing and cooperation and supervision of technology employees, and attracting and retaining more technology employees. And its effect on innovation efficiency increases year by year; (ii) When the enterprise is a non-state-owned enterprise, a high-tech enterprise, the chairman of the board of directors does not have R&D career background, and the proportion of directors with R&D career background in the board of directors is lower, the equity incentive for technical employees is more effective in improving innovation efficiency; (iii) The incentive effect of equity incentive on each incentive object has the law of diminishing marginal effect, and there is also a “free rider” phenomenon caused by the excessive number of incentive objects when encouraging technical employees belonging to the same department. This paper further deepens the research on employee equity incentives, providing empirical evidence for improving equity incentive management methods, designing employee equity incentive plans for enterprises, and human resource management.

Keywords： Technical Employees Equity Incentives Innovation Efficiency

收稿日期 2023-05-15; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金地区项目(71962023);江西省社会科学基金项目(21GL40D);江西省博士后研究人员科研项目择优资助项目(2021KY12)

通讯作者 章卫东(1963— ),男,江西奉新人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司治理与股权融资研究。

作者简介: 刘张发(1982— ),男,江西赣县人,博士后,副教授,主要从事公司财务、企业创新研究

引用本文:

刘张发, 章卫东.技术类员工股权激励与企业创新效率——兼论激励计划授予股票数限额的规定[J]. 经济经纬, 2023,6: 72-82

LIU Zhangfa, ZHANG Weidong.Equity Incentive for Technical Employees and Enterprise Innovation Efficiency: Also on the Provisions of the Limit on the Number of Shares Granted in Incentive Plans[J] Economic Survey, 2023,V40(6): 72-82

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2023/V40/I6/72

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