超额在职消费对债务约束治理效应的影响研究

摘要

债务约束治理效应之一是对上市公司高管薪酬激励产生影响,而在职消费的超额部分作为管理层权力寻租的表现,会影响这一债务约束治理效应。通过对2010—2015年沪、深A股主板上市公司的样本数据进行实证分析得出:随着债务约束的增强,股东会关注债权人利益,通过降低高管薪酬业绩敏感性来减少债务代理成本;在此基础上通过计量超额在职消费发现,超额在职消费会削弱债务约束对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的负向影响,并且这一作用在非国有企业中更为明显。研究结论表明:由于管理层权力给予高管自定薪酬的能力,所以超额在职消费削弱了高管薪酬的债务约束治理效应。旨在给债权人在信贷风险定价时提供新的考量因素。

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	俞静
	王宇辰

关键词：超额在职消费管理层权力债务约束薪酬业绩敏感性公司治理

Abstract：

One of the effects of debt constraints governance is the impact on the compensation incentive of executives in listed companies. As a form of management power rent-seeking, excess perks will affect the governance function of debt constraints. Through an empirical analysis on the sample data of China’s listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock markets from 2010 to 2015, this paper finds that with the increase of debt constraints, shareholders will reduce the debt agency cost by reducing performance sensitivity of senior executives, thus showing more concern for creditors’ interests. By quantifying excess perks, this paper then finds that they can weaken the negative effects of debt constraints on performance sensitivity of senior executives and this weakening effect is more significant in non-state-owned firms. It is found that excess perks weaken the governance effects of debt constraints on executive salaries due to the fact that senior executives are empowered to customize their pay. The purpose of this paper is to provide new considerations to creditors in pricing credit risk.

Keywords： Over-Perks Managerial Power Debt Constraints Pay Performance Sensitivity Corporate Governance

收稿日期 2017-05-17; 接受日期 2018-02-07;

基金资助:

国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL211)

作者简介: 俞静(1969-),女,江苏南通人,博士,副教授,主要从事资本市场的财务会计研究;王宇辰(1992-),男,安徽安庆人,硕士研究生,主要从事资本市场的财务会计研究。

引用本文:

俞静, 王宇辰.超额在职消费对债务约束治理效应的影响研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2018,1: 152-157

YU Jing, WANG Yu-chen.The Influence of Excessive Over-Perks on Debt Constraints Governance[J] Economic Survey, 2018,V35(1): 152-157

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2018/V35/I1/152

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