资本结构选择、内部控制与企业并购绩效——基于A股上市公司的经验研究

摘要

通过上市公司2011—2013年的并购数据研究,探讨在内部控制视角下企业资本结构对公司并购后绩效的影响。研究发现:杠杆缺口对并购绩效产生负面影响,内部控制水平对杠杆缺口影响并购绩效具有正向调节作用。内部控制对国有企业并购后绩效的影响小于民营企业,归因于国有企业并购更多地带有政治因素的干扰,并非完全的资源有效配置结果;杠杆缺口对国有企业并购后绩效的负面影响则大于民营企业,归结于政府预算软约束,致使代理问题和管理层过度自信要比民营企业严重得多,导致资本运作效率低于民营企业。结论表明:提高内部控制水平和科学配置资本结构,对微观经济层面的企业兼并收购有着现实意义。

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关键词：资本结构内部控制并购绩效杠杆缺口

Abstract：

Through a study of M&A data of listed companies between 2011 and 2013, this paper discusses the influence of corporate capital structure on its performance after M&A from the perspective of internal control. It is found that leverage gap is negatively related to M&A performance and internal control has significant positive influence on this relationship. This positive influence from internal control is less significant in SOEs than in private enterprises, which is attributed to the fact that M&A in SOEs is not entirely the result of effective allocation of resources because of political interference. Meanwhile, the negative influence from leverage gap is more significant in SOEs than in private enterprises, which is attributed to the fact that capital operation efficiency in SOEs is lower than in private enterprises because of the soft constraint of government budget, more agent problems and overconfidence in management. The conclusion shows that from the perspective of microeconomic M&A, it is of practical significance to improve the level of internal control and the scientific allocation of capital structure.

Keywords： Capital Structure Internal Control M&A Performance Leverage Gap

收稿日期 2017-03-06; 接受日期 2018-02-07;

基金资助:

国家自然科学基金项目(71572149);四川省2013学术技术带头人培养基金;西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(JBK1507065)

作者简介: 雷卫(1983-),男,陕西宝鸡人,博士研究生,讲师,主要从事公司金融研究;何杰(1967-),男,重庆人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司金融与公司治理研究。

引用本文:

雷卫, 何杰.资本结构选择、内部控制与企业并购绩效——基于A股上市公司的经验研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2018,1: 108-114

LEI Wei, HE Jie.Choice of Capital Structure, Internal Control and Corporate M&A Performance——An Empirical Study Based on A-Share Listed Companies[J] Economic Survey, 2018,V35(1): 108-114

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2018/V35/I1/108

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