我国上市公司高管薪酬激励:绝对激励与相对激励

摘要笔者选取2001年～2011年我国上市公司样本,实证分析研究了我国上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效以及市场绩效之间的关系。研究结果显示,随着薪酬制度的改革与完善,上市公司已逐步建立起与绩效挂钩的薪酬激励机制,中央控股企业、地方性国有企业及民营企业高管薪酬都与企业绩效密切相关。此外,“高绩效”企业实行相对激励与绝对激励相结合的方式,“低绩效”企业则实行绝对激励。

	Service

	把本文推荐给朋友
	加入我的书架
	加入引用管理器
	Email Alert
	RSS
	作者相关文章
	杜江
	黄珊

关键词：高管薪酬业绩敏感性绝对激励相对激励

Abstract： This article aims to study the relations of top management compensation, company performance and market performance in China using 2001-2011 data. We finds out that salary motivation system related with the performance has been built preliminarily during the development of remuneration reform and most of the central holding companies, while local state-owned companies and private companies implement absolute incentive. Besides, when the company performance surpasses the market performance, it implements the combination of absolute incentive and relative incentive; when the company performance is worse than the market performance, it implements absolute incentive, which reveals that the incentive method of top management compensation has asymmetric effects.

Keywords： Top Management Compensation Sensitivity Absolute Incentive Relative Incentive

收稿日期 2013-04-24; 接受日期 2014-06-05;

作者简介: 杜江(1958 -),男,甘肃敦煌人,管理学博士,四川大学经济学院教授,博士生导师,主要从事应用计量经济学、公司金融等研究;黄珊(1992 -),女,河南濮阳人,四川大学经济(吴玉章)学院金融学本科生,主要从事公司金融等研究。

引用本文:

杜江, 黄珊.我国上市公司高管薪酬激励:绝对激励与相对激励[J]. 经济经纬, 2014,3: 78-84

DU Jiang, HUANG Shan.Top Management Compensation Incentive of Chinese Public Companies: Absolute Incentive and Relative Incentive[J] Economic Survey, 2014,V31(3): 78-84

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2014/V31/I3/78