管理层过度自信对公司违规行为的影响研究

摘要近年来我国上市公司违规现象频发,扰乱了资本市场的健康运行。以2004—2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,探究管理层过度自信对公司违规行为的影响。研究表明:管理层过度自信会提高公司违规行为发生的可能性,这种影响在考虑内生性问题和稳健性检验后依然显著。区分违规类型发现,管理层过度自信将引起信息披露违规和经营违规行为的发生。在影响机制上,管理层过度自信促使企业选择进攻型战略、提高企业风险承担水平,进而导致公司违规行为的发生。进一步研究发现,外部审计力度和股权制衡度的提高,特别是机构投资者持股比例的提高,将有效缓解因管理层过度自信而导致的公司违规行为。研究探讨了管理层过度自信对公司违规行为的影响及作用机制,为股东和监管部门提供了新的监管视角与经验证据,也对提升我国上市公司质量具有一定的参考价值。

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	胡海峰
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关键词：公司违规过度自信外部审计股权制衡风险承担

Abstract： In recent years, China's listed companies have frequently violated rules, disrupting the healthy operation of the capital market. This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2004 to 2019 as the research samples to explore the impact of management overconfidence on corporate violations. The study shows that management overconfidence will increase the possibility of corporate irregularities. And it is still significant after considering endogenous problems and robustness test. By distinguishing the types of violations, it is found that management overconfidence will cause the occurrence of information disclosure violations and operation violations. In terms of influence mechanism, management overconfidence urges enterprises to choose aggressive strategies and improve the level of enterprise risk-taking, which leads to the occurrence of corporate violations. Further study indicates that the improvement of external audit and equity balance, especially the increase of the shareholding ratio of institutional investors, will effectively alleviate corporate violations caused by management overconfidence. This study discusses the impact and mechanism of management overconfidence on corporate violations, provides a new regulatory perspective and empirical evidence for shareholders and regulators, and also has a certain reference value for improving the quality of Listed Companies in China.

Keywords： Company's Illegal Behavior Overconfidence External Audit Equity Restriction Risk Taking

收稿日期 2021-12-06; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AJL012);国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD111)

作者简介: 胡海峰(1965— ),男,河南睢县人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事比较金融制度、公司融资理论与政策研究;白宗航(1994— ),男,山东临沂人,博士研究生,主要从事公司融资理论与政策研究;王爱萍(1988— ),女,山东威海人,博士,副教授,主要从事金融发展与经济增长、公司融资理论与政策研究。王爱萍为本文通信作者。

引用本文:

胡海峰, 白宗航, 王爱萍.管理层过度自信对公司违规行为的影响研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,5: 89-98

HU Haifeng, BAI Zonghang, WANG Aiping.A Study on the Influence of Management Overconfidence on Company's Illegal Behavior[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(5): 89-98

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I5/89

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