企业风险承担与分析师盈余预测准确性

摘要以2007—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了企业风险承担水平与分析师盈余预测准确性间的关系。研究结果显示:风险承担显著降低了分析师盈余预测的准确性,经内生性和稳健性检验后该结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,机构投资者持股和国有企业产权性质减弱了风险承担与分析师盈余预测准确性间的负相关关系;金融化程度和代理成本加剧了风险承担与分析师盈余预测准确性间的负相关关系。研究结论对投资者和监管者等外部利益相关者具有一定的启示意义。

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关键词：风险承担信息透明度盈余预测应计盈余管理

Abstract： Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2018 as study samples, this paper examines the relationship between the level of corporate risk-taking and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecast. The results show that risk-taking significantly reduces the accuracy of analysts' earnings prediction, which is still valid after endogenous and robust tests. Further analysis indicates that the shareholding of institutional investors and the property rights of state-owned enterprises weaken the negative correlation between risk-taking and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecast. The degree of financialization and agency costs aggravate the negative correlation between risk bearing and the accuracy of analyst earnings forecast. This conclusion has some implications for investors, regulators and other external stakeholders.

Keywords： Risk-taking Information Transparency Earnings Forecasts Accrual-based Earnings Management

收稿日期 2019-11-27; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目(71602024);财政部会计名家培养工程项目(财会[2019]19号);辽宁省教育厅重点攻关和服务地方项目(LN2020Z10)

作者简介: 张焰朝(1987— ),男,河南安阳人,博士研究生,主要从事公司治理、资本市场财务会计研究;孙光国(1971— ),男,四川宣汉人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事会计准则、资本市场财务会计研究。

引用本文:

张焰朝, 孙光国.企业风险承担与分析师盈余预测准确性[J]. 经济经纬, 2021,2: 112-121

ZHANG Yanchao, SUN Guangguo.Corporate Risk-taking and the Accuracy of Analysts' Earnings Forecast[J] Economic Survey, 2021,V38(2): 112-121

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I2/112

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