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    经济经纬 2022 Issue (3) :128-137
    财政金融 最新目录 | 下期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
    地方官员变更与债券市场风险
邹瑾, 徐梓涵, 崔传涛
四川大学 经济学院,四川 成都 610065
    Local Officials' Turnover and the Risk of Bond Market
    ZOU Jin, XU Zihan, CUI Chuantao
School of Economics, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China
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摘要 中国经济的高质量发展有赖于地方政府与市场的良性互动,考察地方政府行为性因素在债券市场中的作用十分重要。以地方政府行为作为切入点,基于中国信用债市场与地级市官员数据,考察因官员变更导致的地方政府行为非连贯性对债券市场违约率的影响。实证结果显示:地方政府官员变更会导致债券市场违约率上升,且主要作用于非国有企业,在官员任期较长、透明度较低、营商环境较差的地区更为明显。中国债券市场存在政府兜底行为,城投债拓展了地方政府对本地企业兜底的能力。进一步研究发现,在债券市场违约样本中,官员变更年度的企业短期偿债能力和盈利能力均高于未变更年度,说明原有政企关系使一些财务质量不佳的企业留在了债券市场。研究结论为深化金融供给侧结构性改革,防范金融风险提供了经验证据。
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邹瑾
徐梓涵
崔传涛
关键词： 官员变更   政企关系   信用债违约   金融资源配置   风险共振   不确定性     
Abstract： The high-quality development of China's economy depends on the benign interaction between the local government and the market, so it is very important to investigate the role of local government behavioral factors in the bond market. Based on the data of Chinese credit bond market and officials' turnover, this paper studies whether officials' turnover will break the original political connection and thus affect the default of bonds. The results show that the change of local government officials will lead to an increase in the default rate of the bond market, and this effect is mainly affected by non-state-owned enterprises, especially in areas where officials have a longer term of office, less transparency and a poor business environment. It reveals that there is government cover-up behavior in China's bond market. Further study indicates that in the default samples, the officials' turnover will increase the short-term solvency and profitability of the default enterprises, indicating that the original relationship between government and enterprises may make some enterprises with poor financial quality stay in the bond market. This paper provides an empirical evidence for China to guard against financial risks indeepening financial supply-side structural reform.
Keywords： Officials' Turnover   Government-enterprise Relations   Credit Bond Default   Financial Resource Allocation   Risk Co-movement   Uncertainty     
收稿日期 2021-02-17; 接受日期 ;
基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY190)
作者简介: 邹瑾(1981— ),女,四川自贡人,博士,副教授,主要从事房地产金融、金融风险管理研究;徐梓涵(1998— ),女,江苏宝应人,硕士研究生,主要从事金融风险管理研究;崔传涛(1984— ),男,满族,辽宁丹东人,博士,副研究员,主要从事区域经济学研究。
引用本文:   
邹瑾, 徐梓涵, 崔传涛.地方官员变更与债券市场风险[J].  经济经纬, 2022,3: 128-137
ZOU Jin, XU Zihan, CUI Chuantao.Local Officials' Turnover and the Risk of Bond Market[J]  Economic Survey, 2022,V39(3): 128-137
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