混合所有制、股权激励行权限制与全要素生产率

摘要选择2006—2019年沪、深两市A股公司数据,研究了混合所有制改革背景下股权激励行权限制对公司全要素生产率的影响。研究发现:(1)股权激励能够显著提高全要素生产率;进一步将股权激励按照行权限制标准分解为长期权益和短期权益,股权激励行权限制对全要素生产率具有激励效应,其中,短期权益的激励效应更大。(2)混合所有制企业的股权混合度能够促进股权激励(包括长期权益和短期权益)对全要素生产率的激励效应,并且对短期权益激励效应的促进作用更大。(3)在国有控股公司中,降低国有股权能够提升全要素生产率,并且能够促进股权激励对全要素生产率的激励效应。在非国有控股公司中,增加国有股权并不能显著提升全要素生产率,但对股权激励效应具有正向调节作用。研究结论在一定程度上验证了混合所有制改革和股权激励制度的有效性及实施过程中的现实性,为公司强化内部治理以及政府机构完善监管措施、继续推进国企改革和积极发展混合所有制经济提供实证参考依据。

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	王浩

关键词：混合所有制股权激励行权限制长期权益短期权益全要素生产率

Abstract： Based on the data of A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2019, this paper studies the impact of exercise restrictions on equity incentives on total factor productivity under the background of mixed ownership reform. The are following findings. (1) Equity incentive can promote TFP. According to the bank authority standard, equity incentive can be further divided into long-term equity and short-term equity.The exercise restriction of equity incentive has an incentive effect on total factor productivity, among which the incentive effect of short-term equity is greater. (2) Mixed equity degree can promote the incentive effect of equity incentive (including long-term and short-term equity) on TFP and has a greater role in promoting the short-term equity incentive effect. (3) In state-owned holding companies, reducing state-owned equity can improve TFP and has a positive regulatory effect on equity incentive effect. And in non-state-owned holding companies, increasing state-owned equity can't significantly improve TFP, but has a positive regulatory effect. The conclusion of the study verifies the effectiveness and reality of mixed ownership reform and equity incentive system to a certain extent, and provides empirical reference for companies to strengthen internal governance and government agencies to improve regulatory measures, continue to promote the reform of state-owned enterprises and actively develop mixed ownership economy.

Keywords： Mixed Ownership Equity Incentive Vesting Restrictions Long-term Equity Short-term Equity TFP

收稿日期 2021-01-24; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL079);河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2021BJJ005);河南省软科学研究项目(222400410582)

作者简介: 王浩(1973— ),男,河南南阳人,博士,讲师,主要从事资本市场与公司治理研究。

引用本文:

王浩.混合所有制、股权激励行权限制与全要素生产率[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,2: 120-130

WANG Hao.Mixed Ownership, Equity Incentive Vesting Restriction and TFP[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(2): 120-130

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I2/120

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