上市公司股票回购与股权质押风险

摘要以2005—2020年沪深两市A股上市公司作为研究样本,将上市公司股权质押可能引致的风险分为比例、道德、市场和法律四类风险,对上市公司股票回购与股权质押风险的关系进行研究。研究发现:(1)上市公司股票回购能够缓解股权质押引起的本期和未来一期的比例、市场和法律风险及未来一期的道德风险;(2)投资者情绪仅在本期和未来一期的比例及未来一期法律风险中起到部分中介作用;(3)进一步将样本按照产权性质和情绪指数高低进行分类发现,国有控股公司样本中股票回购会提升股权质押比例风险,且投资者情绪无法起到中介作用。高情绪样本和低情绪样本都可以缓解本期和未来一期的比例、市场和法律风险,但投资者情绪只有在低情绪样本中才能起到部分中介作用。以上发现说明股权质押后,上市公司更倾向于利用和创造利好消息抬高股价,从而缓解股权质押风险。

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	宋坤
	田祥宇

关键词：股票回购股权质押投资者情绪公司治理

Abstract： Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2005 to 2020 as the research object, this paper divides the risks caused by equity pledges into four types: proportional risks, moral risks, market risks and legal risks, and studies the relationship between stock repurchase and equity pledge risk. There are following findings: (1) Stock repurchase can alleviate the ratio, market and legal risks of the current and future period, and can also reduce moral hazard of future period caused by equity pledge. (2) Investor sentiment only plays a partly intermediary role in the ratio between the current period and the future period and the legal risk in the future period. (3) After analyzing the samples classified by the nature of property rights and emotional index, it is found that the samples of state-owned holding companies will increase the risk of equity pledge ratio, and investor sentiment can not play an intermediary role. The sample results of private holding companies are consistent with the total sample results. Moreover, both high emotion samples and low emotion samples can alleviate the proportion, market and legal risk of current and future periods, but investor sentiment can only play an intermediary role in low mood samples. The findings mean that after equity pledges, listed companies are more inclined to use and create good news to raise their stock prices, so as to alleviate the risks of equity pledge.

Keywords： Stock Repurchase Equity Pledge Investor Sentiment Corporate Governance

收稿日期 2021-07-14; 接受日期 ;

作者简介: 宋坤(1989-),女,山西太原人,讲师,博士研究生,主要从事证券市场与资本运作研究;田祥宇(1972-),男, 山西汾阳人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事企业财务管理研究。

引用本文:

宋坤, 田祥宇.上市公司股票回购与股权质押风险[J]. 经济经纬, 2021,6: 140-149

SONG Kun, TIAN Xiangyu.Stock Repurchase and Equity Pledge Risk of Listed Company[J] Economic Survey, 2021,V38(6): 140-149

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I6/140

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