种植结构“非粮化”:农地租约稳定性的维度逻辑及其证据

摘要从政府、市场和租期维度解读农地租约稳定性概念,验证分析租约稳定性三个维度及其交互项对农户种植行为的影响。研究表明:政府维度的租约稳定性对农户种植行为“趋粮化”具有正效应;租期维度的租约稳定性与市场维度的租约不稳定会显著诱导农地转入户的“非粮化”种植选择;三个维度交互项的估计结果显示,政府维度租约稳定性会减弱市场维度租约不稳定对种植结构“非粮化”的正向作用,市场维度的租约不稳定会强化租期维度租约稳定性对“非粮化”的正效应,租期维度租约稳定性可以消除政府服务对种植结构“趋粮化”的正向影响;进一步的研究表明,农地转入户对国家政策的了解、交易动机和土地流转纠纷分别在租约稳定性的种植影响中发挥调节作用。租约稳定性具有事前确定与事后影响的双重基因。加强政府服务职能、实现长期转入经营、稳定租金水平是提高流转交易双方租约稳定性、调整种植结构的重要途径。

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	耿鹏鹏

关键词：租约稳定性政府服务农地租期流转租金种植行为

Abstract： This paper interprets the concept of farmland lease stability from the dimensions of government, market and lease term, and validates the impact of the three dimensions of lease stability and their interactions on farmers' planting behavior. The results show that the lease stability of government dimension has a positive effect on “Grain Orientation” of farmer's planting behavior, and the lease stability of the leases dimension and the instability of market-oriented leases will significantly induce the “non-grain-based” planting choice of the transferred households. The estimated results of the interactive terms of the three dimensions show that the stability of the government-dimensional lease will weaken the positive effect of the market-dimensional lease instability on the “non-grainization” of the planting structure, while the instability of the lease in the market dimension will strengthen the positive effect of the lease stability on the “non-grainization”. The stability of the lease can eliminate the positive impact of government services on the “grain-oriented” planting structure. Further evidence shows that the transferee's understanding of national policies, transaction motives and land transfer disputes play a regulatory role in the planting impact of lease stability respectively. This paper emphasizes that the stability of leases has the dual genes of prior determination and post-impact. Therefore, strengthening government service functions, realizing long-term transfer to operation and stabilizing rent levels are important ways of improving the stability of the lease of both parties in the circulation transaction and adjusting the planting structure.

Keywords： Lease Stability Government Service Farmland Lease Term Circulating Rent Planting Behavior

收稿日期 2020-08-18; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:清华大学中国农村研究博士论文奖学金项目(202002);国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA115)

作者简介: 耿鹏鹏(1992—),男,河南洛阳人,博士研究生,主要从事农业经济与制度经济研究。

引用本文:

耿鹏鹏.种植结构“非粮化”:农地租约稳定性的维度逻辑及其证据[J]. 经济经纬, 2021,2: 44-53

GENG Pengpeng.“Non-Grainization” of Planting Structure: the Dimensional Logic and Evidence of Farmland Lease Stability[J] Economic Survey, 2021,V38(2): 44-53

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I2/44

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