高质量的双边投资协定有效防范了中国海外投资风险吗？

摘要全球经济不确定性风险增加,中国海外投资“增而不强”与现有双边投资协定不能为海外投资权益提供有效保障的矛盾日渐突出。本文在构建并测算中国双边投资协定质量指数的基础上,采用中国与103个东道国2003—2017年间双边对外直接投资及其他相关变量的面板数据,运用泊松伪极大似然估计方法进行检验。研究结果表明:高质量的双边投资协定降低了东道国制度缺陷引致的征收等滥用投资壁垒的经营风险,促进中国对外直接投资流入,但双边投资协定质量未能降低中国向制度水平较高东道国投资面临的投资准入风险。制度距离抑制了中国向制度环境恶劣的高风险东道国的对外直接投资,高质量的双边投资协定通过严格的条款设计,明确了东道国对海外投资的保护标准,不仅直接促进中国对外直接投资流入,也通过弱化制度距离的抑制效应,间接促进中国对外直接投资流入。因此,应系统识别中国企业海外投资风险的国家差异,与低风险东道国缔结的双边投资协定应加强对准入前国民待遇、负面清单等条款设计新趋势的研究,与高风险东道国缔结双边投资协定条款应重视各类征收风险有可能给中国企业造成潜在投资损失的细节,并引入独立的“保护伞”条款。

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	刘晶

关键词：对外直接投资双边投资协定质量制度距离

Abstract： With the increase of global economic uncertainty risks, the contradiction between the “growing but not strong” Chinese outward foreign direct investment and the inefficiency of the existing China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties has become increasingly prominent. Based on the panel data of China and its' 103 host countries from 2003 to 2017, this paper constructs and measures the quality index of Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties, and testes the influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties quality on China’s outward foreign direct investment by Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood estimation. The results show that: high qualified Bilateral Investment Treaties reduce the expropriation risks and other abuses of investment barriers caused by institutional defects in the host countries and promote China’s outward foreign direct investment, but the quality of Bilateral Investment Treaties fails to reduce the risks in host countries with robust institution. Institutional distance inhibits China’s outward foreign direct investment to high-risk host countries with poor institution, while the high qualified Bilateral Investment Treaties promote China’s outward foreign direct investment by defining the protection standards offered by the host country for overseas investment through strict provisions design. Hence, it is necessary to systematically identify the host country heterogeneity of Chinese outward foreign direct investment risks. Bilateral investment Treaties concluded with low-risk host countries should focus on new trends in terms of pre-establishment national treatment and negative list. With high-risk host countries, the details of various expropriations that may cause potential losses and the introduction of separate “umbrella” clauses should be attached great importance to.

Keywords： Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment Quality of Bilateral Investment Agreements Institutions and Institutional Distance

收稿日期 2019-04-18; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJCGJW007)

作者简介: 刘晶(1982— ),女,天津人,博士,讲师,主要从事国际直接投资研究。

引用本文:

刘晶.高质量的双边投资协定有效防范了中国海外投资风险吗？[J]. 经济经纬, 2020,1: 59-67

LIU Jing.Does High-Quality BITs Effectively Prevent Chinese Outward Investment from Risks in Host Countries?[J] Economic Survey, 2020,V37(1): 59-67

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2020/V37/I1/59

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