Compensation Regulation Policy and Compensation Equity —A Test Based on PSM-DID Method
DU Shan1, WANG Sheng-nian2
1.School of Accounting, Guizhou University of Finances and Economics, Guiyang 550025; 2.School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000
Abstract Taking the “Pay Ceiling Order” issued in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment,this paper empirically examines the effects of executive compensation regulation on compensation equity through PSM-DID method. The results show that: compensation regulation improves the internal equity and on-the-job consumption of executives in local-government-owned enterprises, but does not impact the external equity. Findings from further analysis are that compensation regulation enhances the incentive effect of internal compensation equity on enterprise performance, and enhances the inhibitory effect of on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance.