Abstract：
To solve the problem of no coordination body and inefficiency caused by bilateral asymmetric information in supply chain, the virtual-third party is introduced to be the principal without its own profit based on the principal-agent theory. And then the incentives coordination model is established to analyze the efficiency of the supply chain. The results show that, although there is the pre-decision risk, both of the supplier and retailer would like to seek the best combination of revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing proportion, to maximize their own interests and then realize the supply chain coordination. Even if sometimes it is unable to reach coordination, not only the supplier is motivated to reduce production costs, but also the seller is willing to cooperate with the supplier with low production costs ,to get more ex post benefits.
HUANG Mei-ping, WANG Xian-yu.A Study of Incentives Coordination and Efficiency in Supply Chain Based on Virtual-third Party[J] Economic Survey, 2014,V31(6): 84-89
2014 
