Institutional Investors,the Separation of Control Right & Cash Flow Right and the Premium of Related Party Assets Reorganization
HOU Jian-ping1, LI Yuan-yuan1, NI Meng2
(1.School of Economics and Management, Xi’an Technological University,Xi’an 710032, China; 2.School of Economics and Management,Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083,China)
Abstract The paper empirically studies the influence of controlling shareholder’s separation rate and institutional shareholders’ holding behavior on related party assets reorganization premium in Chinese listed companies. Our study shows that the rights separation of controlling shareholder is the main cause leading to the imperfection of corporation governance in listed companies. Controlling shareholders grab private benefits through asset reorganization, and the separation rate and institutional shareholders can both effectively affect the premium of the related party asset reorganization by the controlling shareholders.
HOU Jian-Beng,LI Yuan-Yuan,NI Meng. Institutional Investors,the Separation of Control Right & Cash Flow Right and the Premium of Related Party Assets Reorganization. Economic Survey, 2015, 32(2): 087.
2015, Vol. 32 
