Can Analyst Follow up Play the Role of External Governance——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Relationship Between Separation of Two Rights and Overinvestment
Can Analyst Follow up Play the Role of External Governance——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Relationship Between Separation of Two Rights and Overinvestment
ZHANG Ying
School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China
Abstract Using the sample of all the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in the period of 2009 2016, this paper tests whether analyst follow up can inhibit the overinvestment of enterprises resulted from the separation of two rights. It examines the external governance role of analysts and makes a further study to distinguish the nature of property rights while taking into consideration all the possible situations. The empirical result shows that the separation of two rights is positively related to the overinvestment of enterprises. Analyst follow up strengthens the positive relationship between the overinvestment and the separation of two rights and fails to reduce the former. The further study shows that the enhancement effect is more significant in state owned enterprises.
ZHANG Ying. Can Analyst Follow up Play the Role of External Governance——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Relationship Between Separation of Two Rights and Overinvestment. Economic Survey, 2019, 36(2): 0102.
2019, Vol. 36 
