A Study on the Impact of the Open Innovation Based on M&A and Executive Compensation Contracts
ZHENG Yajun1,2, CUI Yongmei1
1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, China
Abstract Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2017 as research objects, this paper empirically tests the impact of the open innovation based on mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation contracts. It is found that the open innovation through M&As can significantly improve the amount of executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity. The reduction of innovation risk and the improvement of innovation output play an intermediary role in the influence of open innovation based on M&A on executive compensation contract. Further study shows that the effect of open innovation based on M&A to improve executive compensation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises, while the effect of improving compensation performance sensitivity is more obvious in private enterprises. In addition, in areas with a high level of marketization, open innovation based on mergers and acquisitions has a more significant impact on executive compensation level and pay performance sensitivity. The conclusion of this paper not only enriches the research on the decision mechanism of executive compensation contract from the perspective of innovation, but also has a certain guiding significance for the formulation of differentiated innovation incentive mechanism.
ZHENG Yajun,CUI Yongmei. A Study on the Impact of the Open Innovation Based on M&A and Executive Compensation Contracts. Economic Survey, 2021, 38(5): 091.
2021, Vol. 38 
