新秀董事对大股东掏空的影响研究

摘要在提出新秀董事“监督无效”和“监督有效”对立假说基础上,运用2012—2022年沪深A股上市公司数据检验了新秀董事对大股东掏空的影响。研究发现,新秀董事加剧了大股东掏空,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立,拒绝“监督有效”假说。考察监督失效的原因表明,新秀董事既表现为“缺乏独立性”,又表现为“缺乏经验”。异质性分析显示,在信息透明度较低、小股东监督能力较弱的企业中,新秀董事与大股东掏空之间的正相关关系更加显著;同时,非学术背景、非海外背景以及非连锁背景的新秀董事对大股东掏空的影响更强。研究结论不仅深化了大股东掏空的影响因素研究,而且有助于全面认识新秀董事对公司治理的影响,对于理解新秀董事在董事会中的作用,以及如何防范大股东掏空都具有重要意义。

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	邵剑兵
	袁东旭

关键词：新秀董事董事会经验大股东掏空小股东监督信息披露质量

Abstract： Based on proposing the opposing hypothesis of “ ineffective supervision ” and “ effective supervision ” for rookie independent directors, this paper uses data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022 to test the impact of rookie independent directors on tunneling out of major shareholders. The results show that rookie independent directors increase major shareholders’ tunneling. This conclusion still holds true after a series of robustness tests, rejecting the “ effective supervision ” hypothesis. The results of examining ineffective functions show that rookie independent directors display both “ lack of independence ” and “ lack of experience”. Heterogeneous analysis reveals that in enterprises with low information transparency and weak supervision capabilities of minority shareholders, the positive correlation between rookie independent directors and tunneling out of major shareholders is more significant. At the same time, rookie independent directors with non-academic backgrounds, non-overseas backgrounds and non-chain backgrounds have a stronger impact on tunneling out of major shareholders. This paper not only deepens the research on the influencing factors of hollowing out of major shareholders, but also helps us comprehensively understand the impact of rookie directors on corporate governance. It is of great significance to understanding the role of rookie independent directors in the board of directors and how to prevent tunneling out of major shareholders.

Keywords： Rookie Independent Directors Board Experience Large Shareholder Tunneling Minority Shareholder Supervision Information Disclosure Quality

收稿日期 2024-11-23; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL081);辽宁大学青年科研基金项目(人文社科类)重点项目(LDQN2024003)

通讯作者 袁东旭(1996— ),男,四川南充人,博士研究生,主要从事公司治理研究

作者简介: 邵剑兵(1973— ),男,辽宁盘锦人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司治理研究。

引用本文:

邵剑兵, 袁东旭.新秀董事对大股东掏空的影响研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2025,4: 134-146

SHAO Jianbing, YUAN Dongxu.A Study on the Impact of Rookie Independent Directors on Tunneling by Major Shareholders[J] Economic Survey, 2025,V42(4): 134-146

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2025/V42/I4/134

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