政府资助能否助推全民慈善？——来自中国慈善基金会的经验证据

摘要利用2005—2020年中国2937家慈善基金会数据,考察了政府资助影响慈善基金会社会捐赠收入的效果及其内在机制,拓展分析了政府资助的市场溢出效应。结果显示,政府资助增加了慈善基金会的社会捐赠收入,激活了不同捐赠主体的慈善热情。作用机制在于政府资助通过推动慈善基金会积极参与筹款活动,以及提升慈善基金会的组织声誉,进而增加了社会公众的捐款。异质性分析表明,这种挤入效应对慈善经验较多、组织规模较大和位于行政等级较低城市的慈善基金会更加明显。进一步研究显示,政府资助对慈善市场上与被资助慈善基金会“亲密程度”较高的其他慈善基金会的社会捐赠收入也具有显著的正向溢出效应;不同政府资助类型均能显著挤入慈善基金会的社会捐赠收入。研究结论为优化财政政策、推动慈善事业高质量发展提供参考。

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关键词：政府资助慈善捐赠挤入效应慈善基金会

Abstract： Based on the unbalanced panel data of 2,937 charitable foundations in China from 2005 to 2020, this study empirically examines the impact of government funding on the social donation income of charitable foundations and its underlying mechanisms, and extends the analysis to the market spillover effects of government funding. The results show that government funding increases the social donation income of charitable foundations and activates the philanthropic enthusiasm of different donors. The mechanism at work is that government funding increases public donations by encouraging charitable foundations to actively participate in fundraising activities and enhancing the organizational reputation of charitable foundations. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this crowd-in effect is more pronounced for charitable foundations with greater philanthropic experience, larger organizational scales, and those located in cities with lower administrative levels. Furthermore, government funding has a significant positive spillover effect on the social donation income of other charitable foundations in the philanthropic market that have a higher “ degree of intimacy ” with the funded foundations. Different types of government funding significantly crowd-in the social donation income of charitable foundations. The aforementioned conclusions provide practical references for optimizing fiscal policies and promoting the high-quality development of the philanthropic sector.

Keywords： Government Funding Charitable Donations Crowd-in Effect Charitable Foundations

收稿日期 2024-08-15; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(22JJD630016);国家社会科学基金项目(21CGL059);国家自然科学基金项目(72174090)

通讯作者 张财经(1996— ),男,四川宣汉人,博士研究生,主要从事社会组织与公益慈善研究。

作者简介: 张奇林(1969— ),男,湖北洪湖人,博士,教授、博士生导师,主要从事社会组织与公益慈善研究

引用本文:

张奇林, 张财经.政府资助能否助推全民慈善？——来自中国慈善基金会的经验证据[J]. 经济经纬, 2025,1: 133-146

ZHANG Qilin, ZHANG Caijing.Can Government Funding Boost Universal Charitable Giving: Empirical Evidencefrom Chinese Charitable Foundations ——Evidence from Chinese Foundations[J] Economic Survey, 2025,V42(1): 133-146

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2025/V42/I1/133

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