财政收入目标与企业非税负担

摘要近年来,我国非税收入征管逐渐规范,但财政收入目标对企业非税负担依然存在影响,企业非税负担的增加有冲抵减税降费政策效果的可能性。基于地级市财政收入目标数据和企业微观数据,通过实证检验探讨财政收入目标与企业非税负担之间的关系。实证结果表明:我国地方政府财政收入目标越高,当地企业的非税负担越重;并且在面临未完成或超额完成的目标时,地方政府会加强非税收入的征管;当地方政府恰好完成目标时,会相应减少非税征收努力。异质性检验发现,城市的同质性会提高竞争效应,使地方政府加强非税征管;此外,与国有企业和大企业相比,非国有企业和中小企业承担了更多的非税负担。拓展性分析表明,税收收入的完成情况对于非税收入的征收有负向作用,地方政府往往选择增加非税收入来应对税收收入的不足,存在一定程度上的税费替代现象。这些研究结论对我国税费征管制度改革具有一定的参考价值。

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	王励晴
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关键词：财政收入目标非税负担策略性征管目标激励税费替代

Abstract： In recent years, the standard degree of non-tax revenue collection and management in China has been strengthened. However, the fiscal revenue target still has an impact on the non-tax burden of enterprises, and the increase of the non-tax burden of enterprises may offset the effect of tax reduction and fee cuts. Based on prefecture-level municipal revenue target data and enterprise micro data, this paper explores the relationship between revenue targets in general public budgets and the non-tax expenditures of firms through empirical tests. The study finds that the higher the target faced by the government is, the greater the non-tax expenditures of firms. When faced with unmet targets or overachieved targets, the local government is motivated by, respectively, a refusal to rank at the bottom or a desire to move up. In contrast, when local governments meet their targets, they reduce their efforts in order to avoid raising their targets for the following year in a target-oriented manner. In the heterogeneity test, it is found that urban homogeneity will improve the competitive effect and make local governments strengthen non-tax management. Further,compared with state-owned enterprises and large enterprises, non-listed companies and small firms bear more of the non-tax burdens. The extended analysis shows that the completion of tax revenue has a negative effect on the collection of non-tax revenue. Local governments often choose to increase non-tax revenue to cope with the lack of tax revenue, and there is a certain degree of Tax-Fee substitution phenomenon. The study of this paper has a certain reference value for the reform of the tax collection and management system in China.

Keywords： Financial Revenue Target Non-tax Burden Strategic Collection and Management Target Incentive Tax-fee Substitution

收稿日期 2021-06-25; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:高等学校学科创新引智计划(B20084);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(202110409)

作者简介: 王励晴(1988— ),女,河南洛阳人,博士研究生,主要从事财政理论与政策研究;谷雨(1994— ),女,河南郑州人,博士研究生,主要从事公共财政、实证税收研究。谷雨为本文通讯作者。

引用本文:

王励晴, 谷雨.财政收入目标与企业非税负担[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,2: 152-160

WANG Liqing, GU Yu.Financial Revenue Target and Non-Tax Burden of Enterprises[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(2): 152-160

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I2/152

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