地方官员变更与新增创业投资

摘要由于官员的个体差异,地方官员变更常常导致当地的政策环境不稳定,影响创投决策。利用2002—2016年地方官员履历信息及创业投资事件,实证检验了地方官员变更对创投机构新增投资活动的作用。实证结果显示:(1)地方官员发生变更导致当年该地的创投机构新增投资显著下降;(2)司法环境放大了地方官员的变更对创投新增投资的不利影响;(3)当地方官员因非常规原因变动或新任官员来自外地时,创投新增投资的下降更加明显。相关研究为创投领域提供了政治经济学视角。

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关键词：地方官员变更政策不确定性创业投资

Abstract： Due to the different political purposes and individual differences of officials, the change of local officials often leads to the instability of the local policy environment and affects the decision-making of venture capital. Based on the resume information of local officials and venture capital events from 2002 to 2016, this paper empirically tests the effect of local official changes on the new investment activities of venture capital institutions. There are following empirical results: (1) When City officials changes, the new investment of venture capital institutions in the city decreases significantly that year. (2) The legal environment magnifies the adverse impact of local official’s turnover on the investment of venture capital. (3) When city officials change due to unconventional reasons or when new officials come from outside the city, the decline in new venture capital investment is even more obvious. The study provides a reference for the field of venture capital from the perspective of political economy.

Keywords： Local officials’ Turnover Policy Uncertainty Venture Capital Investment

收稿日期 2020-05-13; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目(71772111);上海市浦江人才计划(13PJC045)

作者简介: 黄卓群(1989—),女,上海崇明人,博士研究生,主要从事创业投资、官员行为、企业并购与公司金融研究。

引用本文:

黄卓群.地方官员变更与新增创业投资[J]. 经济经纬, 2021,4: 150-160

HUANG Zhuoqun.Local Officials’ Turnover and First-round Investment of Venture Capital[J] Economic Survey, 2021,V38(4): 150-160

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V38/I4/150

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