社会责任与高管变更的“保护伞”和“替罪羊”效应研究

摘要以2010—2017年沪深A股披露社会责任报告的公司为样本,实证检验企业承担社会责任、社会责任缺失与不同类型高管变更之间的关系。研究发现:(1)企业承担社会责任与社会责任缺失对董事长变更没有影响。(2)企业承担社会责任降低了总经理、财务总监和董秘变更的可能性,表明企业社会责任对高管职位起到了“保护伞”效应。(3)企业社会责任缺失提升了财务总监和董秘变更的可能性,却对总经理变更没有影响,这一异常现象可能存在着财务总监或董秘为总经理背锅的“替罪羊”效应。进一步研究发现:企业社会责任缺失提升了总经理不变且财务总监变更、总经理不变且董秘变更的可能性,从而验证了“替罪羊”效应,而两职合一、总经理持股比例提高能够加强“替罪羊”效应。

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关键词：企业社会责任社会责任缺失高管变更 “保护伞”效应 “替罪羊”效应

Abstract： Taking the A-shares listed companies that disclosed the social responsibility report in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2010-2017 as examples, the paper studies the relationship between the corporate social responsibility (CSR),corporate social irresponsibility(CSI) and different types of top management turnover (TMT). The results show that:(1) CSR and CSI have no impact on the change of chairman. (2) CSR reduces the possibility of change of chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO) and secretary of the board, indicating that CSR has a protective umbrella effect on senior management positions. (3) CSI has increased the possibility of changes of the CFO and the secretary of the board, but has no effect on the change of CEO. This abnormal phenomenon may have the scapegoat effect that weak executives are the scapegoat for strong ones. Further research finds that CSI increased the possibility of CEO being in office but CFO out of office and CEO unchanged but secretary of the board change, thus verifying the scapegoat” effect, which can be strengthened by the duality and shareholding ratio.

Keywords： Corporate Social Responsibility Corporate Social Irresponsibility Top Management Turnover Protective Umbrella Effect Scapegoat Effect

收稿日期 2019-12-08; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目(71774050;71573075;71673077);湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20190326)

作者简介: 徐莉萍(1966— ),女,湖南常德人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事环境会计与企业社会责任研究;许仙素(1997— ),女,湖南邵阳人,硕士研究生,主要从事企业社会责任与公司治理研究;刘宁(1992— ),女,湖南宁乡人,博士研究生,主要从事环境会计与企业社会责任研究。

引用本文:

徐莉萍, 许仙素, 刘宁.社会责任与高管变更的“保护伞”和“替罪羊”效应研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2020,5: 116-123

XU Liping, XU Xiansu, LIU Ning.A Research on the Social Responsibility and Protective Umbrella and Scapegoat Effect of Top Management Turnover[J] Economic Survey, 2020,V37(5): 116-123

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2020/V37/I5/116

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