Executive Compensation Incentives’ Anti-Sticky Effect on Expense ——An Empirical Test about Pay Gap and Salary Premium
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Abstract In this study, the author tested the anti-sticky effect of compensation incentives (contain both pay gap and salary premium) empirically and studied the changes of compensation incentives’ anti-sticky effect when market, industry and shareholder are different. Results show that the expense of List Companies in China is significantly “sticky” and compensation incentives are anti-sticky. Comparing to developed area, compensation incentives of the companies in undeveloped area are more effective in reducing stickiness. Compensation incentives of non-manufacturing companies reduce stickiness significantly but not in manufacturing companies. Compensation incentives of SOEs reduce stickiness significantly but not in non-SOEs.
SUN Wei-Zhang,WANG Can,AN Qing-Dao. Executive Compensation Incentives’ Anti-Sticky Effect on Expense ——An Empirical Test about Pay Gap and Salary Premium. Economic Survey, 2016, 33(3): 096.
2016, Vol. 33 
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