A Research into the Incentive Compatibility of the Firm Profit Mechanism in theCost Free Business Mode——Based on an Analysis of the Industry of Online Games
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A Research into the Incentive Compatibility of the Firm Profit Mechanism in theCost Free Business Mode——Based on an Analysis of the Industry of Online Games
LI Da-kai1, SUN Yue-yao1, TENG Li-mei2
1.School of Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China; 2.Library of Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Abstract On the basis of an analysis of online game manufacturers and the characteristics of consumer behavior in the cost free business model, the authors analyzed the profit mechanism of online game manufacturers and consumption selection mechanism. In the theory of incentive compatibility, through an optimal solution to manufacturer profit model and rational consumption selection model, the authors hold that under the cost free business model the profit of online game manufacturers and the gains of consumers are both more than those under the timekeeping charge model. Furthermore in the optimal mechanism, the earnings of manufacturers and consumers are consistent, which verified the manufacturer profit advantage under the cost free business model.
LI Da-Kai,SUN Yue-Yao,TENG Li-Mei. A Research into the Incentive Compatibility of the Firm Profit Mechanism in theCost Free Business Mode——Based on an Analysis of the Industry of Online Games. Economic Survey, 2012, 1(2): 0120.
2012, Vol. 1 
