Controlled Government Level, CEO Political Connections and Agency Cost:Evidence from State-owned Power Generation Listed Firms
HU Yong-ping1,2
1. Research Centre of Finance and Accounting, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400050, China; 2. Mobile Station for Post-doctors, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
Abstract Taking the stated-owned power generation listed firms as samples, using Heckman two-stage regression method, the author made an empirical study of the effect of CEO political connection on agency cost. The results show that CEO political connection can increase agency cost significantly. The CEO political connections can increase the implicit agency cost significantly whereas the CEO political connections in local state-owned companies can enhance the explicit and implicit agency costs and the rate of increase is obviously higher than that for central enterprises, which shows that the widespread CEO political connections in state-owned enterprises aggravate the agency problem.
HU Yong-Beng. Controlled Government Level, CEO Political Connections and Agency Cost:Evidence from State-owned Power Generation Listed Firms. Economic Survey, 2011, 28(5): 0135.
2011, Vol. 28 
