Abstract Based on the sample of China’s A-share listed companies in the years 2007-2017, this paper empirically examines the impact of executive incentives on analysts’ prediction behavior. It is found that both executive compensation and executive equity incentives can significantly improve analysts’ coverage and optimistic forecast tendency. However, the impact of executive compensation incentive and executive equity incentive on the accuracy of analysts’ prediction is heterogeneous. Specifically, executive compensation incentive significantly improves the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts by improving short-term performance, while executive equity incentive increases short-term performance volatility by improving the risk-taking ability of executives, which in turn reduces the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Further research shows that executive power distorts the corporate governance effect of executive incentive to a certain extent, and this distorted effect is recognized by analysts, which affects analysts’ predictive behavior of listed companies.
2019, Vol. 36 
