分析师跟进能否发挥外部治理作用——基于两权分离与过度投资关系的实证分析

摘要以沪、深两市2009—2016年全部上市公司为研究样本,实证检验分析师跟进能否抑制由两权分离导致的企业过度投资行为,以验证分析师的外部治理作用。考虑到不同产权性质下可能存在不同情况,进一步区分产权性质并对其进行研究。实证分析发现两权分离程度与企业过度投资正相关;分析师跟进不仅没能降低由两权分离导致的企业过度投资,反而增强了二者之间的正向关系;进一步研究显示,这种增强效果在国有企业中更为显著。

	Service

	把本文推荐给朋友
	加入我的书架
	加入引用管理器
	Email Alert
	RSS
	作者相关文章
	张莹

关键词：分析师跟进两权分离过度投资

Abstract： Using the sample of all the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in the period of 2009 2016, this paper tests whether analyst follow up can inhibit the overinvestment of enterprises resulted from the separation of two rights. It examines the external governance role of analysts and makes a further study to distinguish the nature of property rights while taking into consideration all the possible situations. The empirical result shows that the separation of two rights is positively related to the overinvestment of enterprises. Analyst follow up strengthens the positive relationship between the overinvestment and the separation of two rights and fails to reduce the former. The further study shows that the enhancement effect is more significant in state owned enterprises.

Keywords： Analyst Follow up Separation of Two Rights Overinvestment

收稿日期 2018-07-31; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL055)

作者简介: 张莹(1987— ),女,蒙古族,内蒙古赤峰人,博士研究生,主要从事会计舞弊与企业并购研究。

引用本文:

张莹.分析师跟进能否发挥外部治理作用——基于两权分离与过度投资关系的实证分析[J]. 经济经纬, 2019,2: 102-109

ZHANG Ying.Can Analyst Follow up Play the Role of External Governance——An Empirical Analysis Based on the Relationship Between Separation of Two Rights and Overinvestment[J] Economic Survey, 2019,V36(2): 102-109

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V36/I2/102