机构股东持股、两权分离与关联方资产重组溢价

摘要笔者实证研究控制股东两权分离和机构股东持股对关联方资产重组溢价率的影响,两权分离是导致上市公司治理不完善的主要原因。在控制股东通过资产重组攫取控制权私有收益时,机构股东持股可有效抑制控制股东通过关联方资产重组的掏空行为,控制股东两权分离程度和机构股东持股比例对中国上市公司关联方资产重组溢价均有显著影响。

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	侯剑平
	李媛媛
	倪虻

关键词：机构股东两权分离资产重组关联方

Abstract： The paper empirically studies the influence of controlling shareholder’s separation rate and institutional shareholders’ holding behavior on related party assets reorganization premium in Chinese listed companies. Our study shows that the rights separation of controlling shareholder is the main cause leading to the imperfection of corporation governance in listed companies. Controlling shareholders grab private benefits through asset reorganization, and the separation rate and institutional shareholders can both effectively affect the premium of the related party asset reorganization by the controlling shareholders.

Keywords： Institutional Investor Separation of Control Right and Cash Flow Right Assets Reorganization Related Party

收稿日期 2015-03-04; 接受日期 2015-03-04;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目 (70673054);陕西省教育厅科研基金项目(12Jk0131)

作者简介: 侯剑平( 1971-) ,男,蒙古族,内蒙古赤峰人,副教授,主要从事计量经济学与金融研究; 李媛媛(1990-),女,安徽蚌埠人,硕士研究生,主要从事公司治理研究。

引用本文:

侯剑平,李媛媛,倪虻.机构股东持股、两权分离与关联方资产重组溢价[J]. 经济经纬, 2015,2: 87-92

HOU Jian-ping, LI Yuan-yuan, NI Meng.Institutional Investors,the Separation of Control Right & Cash Flow Right and the Premium of Related Party Assets Reorganization[J] Economic Survey, 2015,V32(2): 87-92

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2015/V32/I2/87