Abstract:
There is vertical competition of land titling between village collective and farmers in China under the policies of Household Responsibility System. After the implementation of land titling policy, the collective farmland ownership has been “weakened”, and so does its coordinating function in farmland transfer, which makes it harder to realize the concentration of farmland. Based on the farming household data in Guangdong and Jiangxi provinces in 2015 and 2016, and adopting Fmlogit and Order-logit, this paper empirically tests the policy effect of the new round of farmland titling. Results indicate that: 1) land titling policy enhances farmers’ awareness of farmland property rights, while weakening the collective farmland ownership; 2) land titling policy has a significant positive impact on the transfer of farmland, but has a negative impact on the concentration of farmland. It can be inferred that although titling promotes farmland transfer, it becomes even harder to realize the concentration of farmland after the transfer due to the lack of trading coordinator and the lagging development of farmland market.
LIU Kai, LUO Ming-zhong.Land Titling Policy, the Weakening of Collective Property Rights and Its Effect——Discussion Based on Fragmentation[J] Economic Survey, 2018,V35(6): 44-50