最低质量标准、品牌成员数量与农产品区域公用品牌价值

摘要提升农产品区域公用品牌价值是增强农产品竞争力、实现乡村振兴和农业高质量发展的重要途径。在理论上分析最低质量标准、品牌成员数量与农产品区域公用品牌价值三者关系的基础上,选取2010—2019年中国农产品区域公用品牌的面板数据,采用联立方程模型,就最低质量标准与品牌成员数量对农产品区域公用品牌价值的影响进行实证检验,并进一步运用门槛回归模型检验最低质量标准对农产品区域公用品牌价值的门槛特征。结果表明:最低质量标准与品牌成员数量呈正U形曲线关系,随着最低质量标准的提高,品牌成员数量先受成本效应的影响而下降,后受声誉效应的影响而上升;品牌成员数量与农产品区域公用品牌价值呈倒U形曲线关系,即随着品牌成员数量的增加,农产品区域公用品牌价值先上升后下降,由集聚效应转变为拥挤效应;最低质量标准对农产品区域公用品牌价值的影响存在双重门槛,随着最低质量标准由低变高,它对区域公用品牌价值的提升产生先抑制后促进的影响。

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关键词：区域公用品牌品牌价值最低质量标准品牌成员数量

Abstract： Improving the value of regional public brand of agricultural products is an important way to improve the competitiveness of agricultural products and achieve revitalization and high-quality development of agriculture. Based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship among the minimum quality standard, the number of brand members and the value of regional public brand of agricultural products, this paper selects panel data of China agricultural regional brand and uses a simultaneous equation model to conduct an empirical test on the effect of minimum quality standard and the number of brand members on the value of regional public brand of agricultural products, and the threshold regression model is further applied to test the threshold features of minimum quality standard on the value of regional public brands. The results are as follows: Firstly, the relationship between the minimum quality standard and the number of brand members is a positive U-shaped curve. With the improvement of the minimum quality standard, the number of brand members decreases at first by the cost effect, and then increases by the reputation effect. Secondly, the relationship between the number of brand members and the value of regional public brand of agricultural products presents an inverted U-shaped curve, that is, with the increase of the number of brand members, the regional public brand value of agricultural products increases at first and then decreases, which changes from agglomeration effect to crowding effect. Finally, there is a double threshold for the impact of minimum quality standards on the value of regional public brand of agricultural products. As the minimum quality standard changes from low to high, it will have a suppressing and then promoting effect on the value of regional public brands of agricultural products.

Keywords： Regional Public Brand Brand Value Minimum Quality Standard Number of Brand Members

收稿日期 2021-09-07; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目(71673087)

作者简介: 董银果(1969— ),女,陕西乾县人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要从事农产品贸易、SPS措施及农业产业政策等研究;钱薇雯(1994— ),女,上海人,博士研究生,主要从事农产品贸易、农产品区域公用品牌研究。钱薇雯为本文通讯作者。

引用本文:

董银果, 钱薇雯.最低质量标准、品牌成员数量与农产品区域公用品牌价值[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,1: 36-46

DONG Yinguo, QIAN Weiwen.Minimum Quality Standard, Number of Brand Members and Value of Regional Public Brand of Agricultural Products[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(1): 36-46

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I1/36

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