高管激励会影响分析师预测行为吗？

摘要以2007—2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了高管激励制度对分析师预测行为的影响。研究发现,无论是高管薪酬激励还是高管股权激励,都能够显著提高分析师关注度与分析师乐观预测倾向。但是,高管薪酬激励与高管股权激励对分析师预测准确度的影响存在异质性。具体而言,高管薪酬激励通过改善公司短期业绩显著提高了分析师预测的准确度,但高管股权激励通过提高高管风险承担能力加剧了公司短期业绩波动,反而降低了分析师预测的准确度。进一步研究表明,高管权力在一定程度上扭曲了高管激励的公司治理效应,而这种扭曲效应被分析师识别到了,进而影响了分析师对上市公司的预测行为

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	朱杰

关键词：高管激励分析师预测行为

Abstract： Based on the sample of China’s A-share listed companies in the years 2007-2017, this paper empirically examines the impact of executive incentives on analysts’ prediction behavior. It is found that both executive compensation and executive equity incentives can significantly improve analysts’ coverage and optimistic forecast tendency. However, the impact of executive compensation incentive and executive equity incentive on the accuracy of analysts’ prediction is heterogeneous. Specifically, executive compensation incentive significantly improves the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts by improving short-term performance, while executive equity incentive increases short-term performance volatility by improving the risk-taking ability of executives, which in turn reduces the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. Further research shows that executive power distorts the corporate governance effect of executive incentive to a certain extent, and this distorted effect is recognized by analysts, which affects analysts’ predictive behavior of listed companies.

Keywords： Executive Incentives Analysts Prediction Behavior

收稿日期 2018-10-08; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:北京市教育科学规划重点课题(ADA14116)

作者简介: 朱杰(1987— ),男,湖北秭归人,博士研究生,主要从事财务会计与资本市场研究。

引用本文:

朱杰.高管激励会影响分析师预测行为吗？[J]. 经济经纬, 2019,5: 135-142

ZHU Jie.Does Executive Incentives Affect Analysts’ Prediction Behavior?[J] Economic Survey, 2019,V36(5): 135-142

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V36/I5/135

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