派遣董事对创业投资机构投资、募资的影响研究

摘要收集2000—2019年融资和退出事件的数据,运用多变量回归模型和Heckman模型,研究创业投资派遣董事对其投资和募资产生的影响,以及异质性创业投资机构的声誉、联合投资策略和地理邻近性等特征对于上述影响的调节效应。研究表明:创业投资派遣董事能够加强对企业的控制,促使董事会发挥有效的监督作用,也能够获得投资者的信任,最终可以显著提升创业投资机构的投资绩效,扩大其募资规模。异质性创业投资机构的特征对其派遣董事与投资绩效、募资规模之间的关系具有调节作用,即高声誉、选择联合投资策略、远距离投资的投资机构,派遣董事对于其投资绩效的促进作用更加明显;高声誉、选择单独投资策略、远距离投资的投资机构,派遣董事对于其募资规模的促进作用更加明显。研究结论揭示了创业投资派遣董事对其投资和募资的影响机制,为提升创业投资机构的投资绩效、完善企业董事会治理提供了经验证据。

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	韩瑾
	陈敏灵

关键词：创业投资派遣董事投资绩效募资规模声誉联合投资

Abstract： On the basis of collecting the data of financing and exit events from 2000 to 2019, this paper uses multivariate regression model and Heckman model to study the impact of venture capital accredited directors on their investment and fund-raising, as well as the moderating effects of heterogeneous venture capital institutions' reputation, joint investment strategy and geographical proximity on the above effects. The results show that accrediting directors can strengthen the control of venture capital over the enterprise, promote the board of directors to play an effective supervisory role, gain the trust of investors, ultimately improve the investment performance and expand their fund-raising scale. The characteristics of heterogeneous venture capital institutions can regulate the relationship among accredited directors, their investment performance and fund-raising scale, that is, for investment institutions with high reputation, joint investment strategy and long-distance investment, the role of accrediting directors to promote their investment performance is more obvious for investment institutions with high reputation, independent and long-distance investment, the role of accrediting directors to promote their fund-raising scale is more obvious. This paper reveals the impact mechanism of venture capital accrediting directors on its own investment and fund-raising, and also provides empirical evidence for improving the investment performance of venture capital and improving the governance of enterprise board of directors.

Keywords： Venture Capital Accredited Directors Investment Performance Fund-raising Scale Reputation Joint Investment

收稿日期 2021-09-22; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630046);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2018S21);陕西省创新能力支撑计划项目(2020KRM132);陕西省教育厅专项科研计划项目(18JK0288)

作者简介: 韩瑾(1979— ),女,河北冀县人,博士,讲师,主要从事风险投资与创业管理研究;陈敏灵(1975— ),男,重庆人,博士,副教授,主要从事风险投资与创业管理研究。

引用本文:

韩瑾, 陈敏灵.派遣董事对创业投资机构投资、募资的影响研究[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,2: 99-109

HAN Jin, CHEN Minling.A Study on the Impact of Accredited Directors on Investment and Fund-raising of Venture Capital Institutions[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(2): 99-109

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I2/99

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