容错机制建设、担当激励与企业创新

摘要基于大型国企集团交错发布容错纠错机制实施办法这一准自然实验场景,实证考察了容错免责机制对国有企业创新意愿的影响。双重差分模型结果显示:容错免责制度的实施显著提升了国有企业研发投入水平,激发了企业参与创新的热情。在经过一系列稳健性检验后,这一结论依然成立。进一步的横截面分析发现,上述提升效应在高管政治晋升机会较高、具有沿海开放城市工作经历以及面临经济政策不确定性较大时表现得更为明显。最后的经济效果检验表明,容错纠错机制的实施通过提升企业创新水平,使其获得了显著为正的市场绩效。研究成果拓展和丰富了企业创新行为影响因素以及科技评价领域的相关文献,探究了试错容错环境变化影响高管创新意愿的作用机理,为后续关于业绩考核与国有企业创新相关的研究提供了参考,为政策制定部门深入推动试错、容错有关制度规范的建设提供了经验证据和理论借鉴。

	Service

	把本文推荐给朋友
	加入我的书架
	加入引用管理器
	Email Alert
	RSS
	作者相关文章
	赵玲
	黄昊

关键词：容错免责国企创新政治晋升高管经历经济政策不确定性市场反应

Abstract： Based on the quasi-natural experimental scenario of “implementation method of fault tolerance and error correction mechanism” issued by large state-owned enterprise groups, this paper empirically examines the impact of failure-tolerance exemption on state-owned enterprises' willingness to innovate.The results of the double difference model show that the implementation of fault-tolerant exemption system significantly improves the level of R & D investment of state-owned enterprises and stimulates the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in innovation.After a series of robustness tests, this conclusion is still valid. Further cross-sectional analysis shows that the above promotion effect is more obvious when senior executives have a higher chance of political promotion, have work experience in open coastal cities and face greater economic policy uncertainty. Further research shows that the failure-tolerant and error correction mechanism can improve the innovation level of enterprises, and make them obtain significant positive market performance. The results expand and enrich the relevant literature in the field of enterprise innovation behavior and science and technology evaluation, and explore the mechanism that the change of trial and error tolerance environment affects executive's willingness to innovate. And it provides a reference for the follow-up research on the relationship between performance evaluation and state-owned enterprise innovation, and provides empirical evidence and theoretical reference for policy-making departments to promote the construction of trial and error-tolerant systems and norms.

Keywords： Failure-tolerance Mechanism Innovation of State-owned Enterprises Political Promotion Executive Experience Uncertainty of Economic Policy Market Reaction

收稿日期 2021-01-07; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:四川省科技厅软科学项目(22RKX0362);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102192;72102187)

作者简介: 赵玲(1992— ),女,四川泸州人,博士,讲师,主要从事企业创新与资本市场异象研究;黄昊(1992— ),男,江西九江人,博士,讲师,主要从事政策环境与企业创新研究。

引用本文:

赵玲, 黄昊.容错机制建设、担当激励与企业创新[J]. 经济经纬, 2022,2: 110-119

ZHAO Ling, HUANG Hao.Fault-tolerance Construction, Responsible Incentive and Corporate Innovation[J] Economic Survey, 2022,V39(2): 110-119

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V39/I2/110

蔡春,黄昊,赵玲,2019.高铁开通降低审计延迟的效果及机制研究[J].会计研究(6):72-78.
陈德球,金雅玲,董志勇,2016.政策不确定性、政治关联与企业创新效率[J].南开管理评论(4):27-35.
程津培,李晓轩,徐芳,2019.行进中的中国科技评价制度改革[J].中国科学基金(2):105.
姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙,2016.董秘财务经历与盈余信息含量[J].管理世界(9):161-173.
金宇超,靳庆鲁,宣扬,2016.“不作为”或“急于表现”:企业投资中的政治动机[J].经济研究(10):126-139.
李晓庆,杨帆,朱苏祺,等,2021.公司治理效率、外部治理与商业银行绩效[J].江淮论坛 (1):44-53.
李湛,张良,罗鄂湘,2019.科技创新政策、创新能力与企业创新[J].科研管理(10):14-24.
伦蕊,2020.女性高管、研发强度与决策情境[J].经济经纬(5):124-132.
权小锋,醋卫华,尹洪英,2019.高管从军经历、管理风格与公司创新[J].南开管理评论(6):140-151.
申宇,黄昊,赵玲,2018.地方政府“创新崇拜”与企业专利泡沫[J].科研管理(4):83-91.
万庄,2018.关于完善干部激励约束和容错纠错机制的几点探讨[J].中国行政管理(10):86-89.
王靖宇,张文珂,李慧聪,2020.国有企业冗员与企业创新[J].经济经纬(3):117-124.
杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华,2013.“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界(3):23-33.
余明桂,潘红波,2008.政府干预、法治、金融发展与国有企业银行贷款[J].金融研究(9):1-22.
张栋,胡文龙,毛新述,2021.研发背景高管权力与公司创新[J].中国工业经济(4):156-174.
张璇,刘贝贝,汪婷,等,2017.信贷寻租、融资约束与企业创新[J].经济研究(5):161-174.
赵蔡晶,吴柏钧,2020.智慧城市建设促进了城市发展质量提升吗？——基于多期DID方法的政策效应评估[J].经济经纬(6):18-27.
赵静,黄敬昌,刘峰,2018.高铁开通与股价崩盘风险[J].管理世界(1):157-168.
郑志刚,林仁韬,赵锡军,2012.国企高管的政治晋升与形象工程:基于N省A公司的案例研究[J].管理世界(10):146-156.
周铭山,张倩倩,2016.“面子工程”还是“真才实干”?——基于政治晋升激励下的国有企业创新研究[J].管理世界(12):116-132.
ADHIKARI B K,AGRAWAL A,2016.Religion,gambling attitudes and corporate innovation[J].Journal of corporate finance,37(3):229-248.
BAKER S R,NICHOLAS B,DAVIS S J,2016.Measuring economic policy uncertainty[J].Quarterly journal of economics,131(4):1593-1636.
CAO X,LEMMON M,PAN X,et al,2019.Political promotion,CEO incentives,and the relationship between pay and performance[J].Management science,65(7):2947-2965.
CHEN D,KIM J B,LI O Z,et al,2018.China's closed pyramidal managerial labor market and the stock price crash risk[J].Accounting review,93(3):105-131.
CHEN Q,CHEN X,SCHIPPER K,et al,2012.The sensitivity of corporate cash holdings to corporate governance[J].The review of financial studies,25(12):3610-3644.
HIRSHLEIFER D,LOW A,TEOH S H,2012.Are overconfident CEOs better innovators[J].The Journal of finance,67(4):1457-1498.
HOLMSTROM B,1989.Agency costs and innovation[J].Journal of economic behavior and organization,12(3):305-327.
KANG W,LEE K,RATTI R A,2014.Economic policy uncertainty and firm-level investment[J].Journal of macroeconomics,39(1):42-53.
MANSO G,2011.Motivating innovation[J].Journal of finance,66(5):1823-1860.
SERFLING M,2016.Firing costs and capital structure decisions[J].Journal of finance,71(5):2239-2285.