信息披露质量与上市公司债务融资选择——基于深交所信息披露考评数据的实证分析

摘要基于2001—2016年深圳证券交易所上市公司信息披露的数据,结合面板固定效应及Tobit模型,研究了信息披露质量对上市公司债务融资选择的影响。研究发现:(1)信息披露质量的提高有助于公司获得公开市场债务融资;(2)信息披露质量越高,公司的债务期限结构越偏向于配置长期债务。信息披露质量的提高有助于优化公司融资结构,降低债务期限错配风险,保证债务可持续性,最终可促进优化杠杆结构目标的实现

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关键词：信息披露质量债务融资结构债务期限结构

Abstract： Based on the panel data of information disclosure evaluation of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2016, this paper combines the panel fixed effect model with the Tobit model to study the impact of information disclosure quality on the debt financing options of listed companies. The results show that: 1) The increase in the quality of information disclosure can help the company obtain debt financing from the open market; 2) The higher the quality of information disclosure is, the more inclined the company is to allocate long-term debt in debt maturity. The increase in the quality of information disclosure is conducive to optimizing the corporate financing structure and lowering the risk of misallocation of debt maturity, which can ensure debt sustainability and eventually help achieve the goal of optimizing leverage structure.

Keywords： Information Disclosure Quality Debt Financing Structure Debt Maturity Structure

收稿日期 2018-11-15; 接受日期 ;

基金资助:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJCZH067);中央高校基本科研业务费探索研究基金项目(WE1824005);全国统计科学研究项目一般项目(2018LY68)

作者简介: 黄秀女(1985— ),女,广西南宁人,博士,主要从事融资研究;钱乐乐(1987— ),男,江苏连云港人,博士研究生,主要从事公司金融研究。

引用本文:

黄秀女, 钱乐乐.信息披露质量与上市公司债务融资选择——基于深交所信息披露考评数据的实证分析[J]. 经济经纬, 2019,5: 158-164

HUANG Xiu-nv, QIAN Le-le.Information Disclosure Quality and Debt Financing Options of Listed Companies —Empirical Analysis Based on Data of Information Disclosure Evaluation from Shenzhen Stock Exchange[J] Economic Survey, 2019,V36(5): 158-164

链接本文:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/ 或 http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V36/I5/158

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