[an error occurred while processing this directive] | [an error occurred while processing this directive]
Managerial Entrenchment and Risk Taking of Enterprises——Regulatory Effect of Equity Incentives
WU Jian-xiang 1,2, LI Bing-xiang 1
1.School of Economics and Management, Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an 710054, China;2.School of Statistics, Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, Xi’an 710100, China
Abstract Based on the hypothesis of risk aversion and risk seeking of agents in the agent theory, this paper studies the relationship and influence mechanism about managerial entrenchment and risk taking of enterprises, and discusses the regulatory effect of equity incentives on the relationship. The results show that managerial entrenchment reduces the corporate risk taking, showing more risk aversion behavior in managers as a way of maintaining their position and maximizing their benefit. Managerial equity incentives have a positive correlation with risk taking, and have a positive regulatory effect on the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the corporate risk taking. Equity incentives can motivate managers to adopt more risk-taking measures.
TUN Jian-Xiang,LI Bing-Xiang-. Managerial Entrenchment and Risk Taking of Enterprises——Regulatory Effect of Equity Incentives. Economic Survey, 2017, 34(5): 0104.
2017, Vol. 34 
[an error occurred while processing this directive] | [an error occurred while processing this directive]
