Financial Marketization, Administrator Power and Allocation Efficiency of Capital

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Abstract This article studies the investment efficiency of listed companies combining macroscopic financial development with micro administrator power,based on the special institutional background in China, according to the theory of difference of financing constraints by heterogeneous property right structure and agency cost theory. Results show that manager’s power does not improve investment efficiency, and the improvement of financial marketization does not promote the relationship between managers power and investment efficiency, instead inefficient investments continue to expand. It provides a new empirical evidence to interpret the phenomenon of “high investment, low efficiency” of listed companies and to enrich financial theory and corporate governance theory.

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	HAN Lin-Jing

Key words： Interaction Orientation Strategic Orientation Firm Performance Fs/QCA Interaction Orientation Strategic Orientation Firm Performance Fs/QCA Financial Marketization Administrator Power Allocation Efficiency of Capital

Received: 2016-12-06

ZTFLH:

F832

Cite this article:

HAN Lin-Jing. Financial Marketization, Administrator Power and Allocation Efficiency of Capital. Economic Survey, 2017, 34(3): 0111.

URL:

http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V34/I3/0111