Nature of Real Controller, Government Intervention and Corporate Libility
LI Bin1, SU Kun2
1.School of Economics and Finance, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710061, China; 2.School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnic University, Xi’an 710072, China
Abstract This paper examines the bank-lending discrimination between firms with different nature of real controller and the differences under different intervention extent. Results show: state owned firms can obtain credit resources more easily, so they have higher debt level. Relative to regions with larger government intervention, regions with lower government intervention, the government has lower motivation to intervene bank credit policies, so the differences of debt levels would be relatively small. This paper not only enriches the related studies on corporate liability, but also helps us deeply understand the institutional roots of the irrational corporate liability.
2013, Vol. 1 
