Political Relevance, Financial Annual Report Baleful Patch and Debt Financing Contract——An Empirical Research Based on the Actual Controllers’ Political Status of Chinese Private Listed Companies
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Political Relevance, Financial Annual Report Baleful Patch and Debt Financing Contract——An Empirical Research Based on the Actual Controllers’ Political Status of Chinese Private Listed Companies
Pan Ke-qin
Accountancy School, Henan University of Economics and Law, Zhengzhou 450002, China
Abstract Taking the private listed companies of China from 2003 to 2008 as samples, the author empirically analyzes the actual controllers’ political status, the malicious patch of financial annual report and its influence on debt financing contract and finds that the higher the actual controllers’ political status, the less the phenomenon that listed companies release baleful patch of financial annual report; if listed companies issue malicious financial patch, the size of loans of the next year will decrease obviously, but the above negative effect of the political connection reduces obviously, which shows that the political relevance of the actual controllers of listed companies strengthens the self-discipline governance of listed companies out of maintaining the potential competitive edge. Thus the debt integrity is reinforced and the signature of debt contract is promoted.
BO Ke-Qi. Political Relevance, Financial Annual Report Baleful Patch and Debt Financing Contract——An Empirical Research Based on the Actual Controllers’ Political Status of Chinese Private Listed Companies. Economic Survey, 2012, 1(2): 075.
2012, Vol. 1 
