“Prisoner's Dilemma” of Enterprise Knowledge Alliance Revenue Sharing and Its Countermeasures [an error occurred while processing this directive]
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Economic Survey  2012, Vol. Issue (1): 087    DOI:
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“Prisoner's Dilemma” of Enterprise Knowledge Alliance Revenue Sharing and Its Countermeasures
CHEN Dong ling
(School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China)
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Abstract There are many reasons for the low success rate of enterprises knowledge alliance, one of which is the dilemma of revenue sharing, but few scholars have discussed this issue in depth. Using game theory, considering synthetically the related factors which affect the revenue sharing of enterprise knowledge alliance, the author analyzed the “prisoner's dilemma” of revenue sharing, put forward solutions, including finding the revenue sharing coefficient and discount factor which can achieve the Pareto optimal of alliance revenue sharing and carefully choosing alliance partners, etc.
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CHEN Dong-Ling
Key wordsenterprise knowledge alliance   revenue sharing   “prisoner's dilemma”   countermeasures     
Received: 2011-05-07
ZTFLH:  F270  
Cite this article:   
CHEN Dong-Ling. “Prisoner's Dilemma” of Enterprise Knowledge Alliance Revenue Sharing and Its Countermeasures. Economic Survey, 2012, (1): 087.
URL:  
http://www.jjjw.org.cn/CN/Y2012/V/I1/087
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