The Size of Local Government under the Condition of PromotionIncentive and Fiscal Decentralization
XIE Qiao-xin 1, KONG Liu-liu 2, ZHANG Yu 2
(1. Zhijiang College, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310000, China|2.Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China)
Abstract The relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of local government has been researched deeply by western scholars, but promotion incentive is not involved. However, the evaluation and promotion of local officials by the central government have significant influence on the behavior of local officials because of China's highly centralized political system. Through constructing a theoretical model, the authors explore the behavior patterns of local officials under the condition of promotion incentive and fiscal decentralization, and hold that horizontal comparison achievement evaluation means which is dominated by economic growth will propel some local officials to make more efforts to increase fiscal revenue in the condition that the regional economic gaps are widening, and thus promote the immoderate expansion of the size of local government
XIE Jiao-Cuan- １,KONG Liu-Liu- ２,ZHANG Yu- ２. The Size of Local Government under the Condition of PromotionIncentive and Fiscal Decentralization. Economic Survey, 2011, 28(3): 0118.
2011, Vol. 28 
