How Does Shareholder Networks Stability Inhibit Corporate Misconduct: Based on Dynamic Social Network Analysis Method
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Abstract Based on the dynamic social network analysis, this paper empirically examines the impact and mechanism of shareholder network stability on corporate misconduct using data from Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2008-2023. The regression results show that the stability of the shareholder network significantly inhibits enterprise's misconduct, and this conclusion is also hold after a series of robustness tests. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that compared to enterprises with low network but high stability, enterprises with high network and stability have fewer violations. Moreover, in the samples of state-owned enterprises, highly competitive industries and low marketization, the negative correlation between the stability of the shareholder network and company's misconduct is more significant. Further analysis reveals that the stability of a company's shareholder network alleviates financing constraints and improves enterprise governance, thereby inhibiting enterprise misconduct. This study not only enriches the theoretical research in the direction of social networks and corporate misconduct, but also provides new perspectives for the regulation of capital markets. In particular, the proposed concept of shareholder network stability provides new perspectives and methods for future research on dynamic network analysis.
QIU Xuemei,ZHANG Xuehua. How Does Shareholder Networks Stability Inhibit Corporate Misconduct: Based on Dynamic Social Network Analysis Method. Economic Survey, 2025, 42(6): 0133.
2025, Vol. 42 
