Abstract Based on proposing the opposing hypothesis of “ ineffective supervision ” and “ effective supervision ” for rookie independent directors, this paper uses data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022 to test the impact of rookie independent directors on tunneling out of major shareholders. The results show that rookie independent directors increase major shareholders’ tunneling. This conclusion still holds true after a series of robustness tests, rejecting the “ effective supervision ” hypothesis. The results of examining ineffective functions show that rookie independent directors display both “ lack of independence ” and “ lack of experience”. Heterogeneous analysis reveals that in enterprises with low information transparency and weak supervision capabilities of minority shareholders, the positive correlation between rookie independent directors and tunneling out of major shareholders is more significant. At the same time, rookie independent directors with non-academic backgrounds, non-overseas backgrounds and non-chain backgrounds have a stronger impact on tunneling out of major shareholders. This paper not only deepens the research on the influencing factors of hollowing out of major shareholders, but also helps us comprehensively understand the impact of rookie directors on corporate governance. It is of great significance to understanding the role of rookie independent directors in the board of directors and how to prevent tunneling out of major shareholders.
SHAO Jianbing,YUAN Dongxu. A Study on the Impact of Rookie Independent Directors on Tunneling by Major Shareholders. Economic Survey, 2025, 42(4): 0134.
2025, Vol. 42 
